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AGE-BASED EXIT INCENTIVES, COERCION, AND THE
PROSPECTIVE WAIVER OF ADEA RIGHTS: THE
FAILURE OF THE OLDER WORKERS BENEFIT
PROTECTION ACT
Michael C. Harper*
INTRODUCTION

T

HE enactment in 1990 of the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act ("OWBPA")' can be hailed as further proof of a national
consensus against age discrimination. The Democratic congressional
leadership reacted quickly to overturn the Supreme Court's 1989
holding in Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts 2 that

employee benefit plans that discriminate on the basis of age do not
violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")3
unless they are a subterfuge for other forms of discrimination proscribed by the ADEA. This reaction was even more immediate and
direct than that provoked by a series of race and sex discrimination
* Professor of Law, Boston University. I wish to thank my colleagues in the Boston
University Law School workshop program for their helpful comments. I also thank the Law
School for its generous research support.
I Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
2 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
3 29 U.S.C. § 621.
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cases decided by the Supreme Court in the same term.4 Evincing a
strong consensus, the OWBPA was passed almost unanimously by
Congress and then accepted by the President a year before the enactment of legislation treating the race and sex discrimination cases.'
Moreover, Title II of the OWBPA reflects further legislative and
executive intent that the release or waiver of age discrimination claims
under the ADEA be subject to special standards and scrutiny beyond
those judicially developed for race and sex discrimination claims
under Title VII.6 Apparently, American political leaders have discerned and expressed a widely held belief that age discrimination in
employment is not acceptable in our society.
This Article argues that the OWBPA nevertheless significantly
compromises achievement of the antidiscrimination goals of the
ADEA-promoting the "employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age," and prohibiting "arbitrary age discrimination
in employment."' 7 Both parts of the OWBPA, including Title I,
which overrules Betts to provide only limited defenses to age discrimination in employee benefit plans, and Title II, governing waivers of
ADEA rights, reflect a general acceptance of what this Article terms
conditional age-based exit incentives. Employers offering such incentives provide a limited group of their employees, defined in part
overtly or covertly by age, the opportunity to obtain some kind of
valuable benefit if they resign their employment without forcing the
employer to consider them for discharge. These exit incentives are
conditional because they are not guaranteed for any employee who is
discharged involuntarily and because they are offered only during a
limited temporal window. Perhaps in part in response to the development of ADEA law, these exit incentives have proliferated during the
last two decades.'
4 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).

5 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
6 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
7 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).

8 Exit incentive programs have been stimulated by the recessions of 1973-75 and 1983-85, as
well as by major structural changes in the last two decades in the American economy brought
about through mergers and retrenchments. See Elizabeth L. Meier, American Ass'n of
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This Article explains how these incentives can be an effective means
of thwarting achievement of the ADEA's goals. It will also argue
that the OWBPA's general acceptance of these exit incentive windows
is fundamentally inconsistent not only with the treatment that Title II
of this Act grants to prospective waivers of ADEA-based rights, but
also with the treatment given by the courts to the prospective waiver
of Title VII-based rights. Finally, this Article will explain how Congress could meet the challenge posed for the ADEA by these exit

incentive windows without completely denying employers the option
to grant all the retirement benefits their employees deserve. The

OWBPA's failure to meet this challenge constitutes a substantial
qualification of the professed national commitment to the ADEA's
antidiscrimination goals. Until now, the extent of this problem has
not been fully appreciated by Congress, the courts, 9 or other

commentators.10
Retired Persons, Early Retirement Incentive Programs-Trends and Implications 1 (1986)
(unpublished manuscript, on fie with the Virginia Law Review Association).
In a 1985 survey of 529 companies, Hewitt Associates found that 32% (or 169) had offered
some form of voluntary separation plan. Of these plans, 72% (or 121) were "early retirement
windows." Hewitt Assocs., Plan Design and Experience in Early Retirement Windows and in
Other Voluntary Separation Plans 1 (1986). A General Accounting Office report found that
80% of the Fortune 100 companies had sponsored some form of an exit incentive program in
the decade from 1979 to 1988. General Accounting Office, Age Discrimination: Use of
Waivers by Large Companies Offering Exit Incentives to Employees 2 (1989). Another study
conducted in 1985 found that larger companies are more likely to use age-based exit incentive
programs; at the time of this study 41% of firms with more than one thousand employees had
age-based exit incentive programs. See Meier, supra, at 4 (relying on an unpublished AARP
study).
During the period of proliferation of these programs, Congress amended the ADEA to
proscribe all forms of mandatory retirement and to raise the age cap on protected private
sector employees from 65 to 70, while eliminating it completely for the public sector. See Pub.
L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978). It was amended again in 1986 to remove the age cap
altogether. See Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (1986).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 70-106.
10See, e.g., Neil H. Abramson, Early Retirement Incentives Under the ADEA, 11 Indus.
Rel. L.J. 323 (1989) (describing and endorsing the dominant pre-Betts law); Andrea S.
Christensen, Are Early Retirement Offers Coercive?, Proceedings of New York University 41st
Annual National Conference on Labor, 13-1 (1988) (describing pre-Betts law); Charles B.
Craver, The Application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to Persons over
Seventy, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 52, 96-106 (1989) (describing pre-Betts law); Richard G. Kass,
Early Retirement Incentives and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 4 Hofstra Lab.
L.J. 63 (1986) (condemning all early retirement incentives, whether or not conditional); Judith
A. McMorrow, Retirement and Worker Choice: Incentives to Retire and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 B.C. L. Rev. 347 (1988) (describing pre-Betts law).
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The theses of this Article shall be developed in the following manner. Part I shall explain how conditional age-based exit incentive windows can be used by employers to achieve indirectly what the ADEA
clearly prohibits when accomplished directly: the removal from
employment of a group of employees chosen, at least in part, on the
basis of their age. This Part further explains how this removal is
accomplished by effectively inducing employees to waive prospectively their future ADEA protection. Part II analyzes the treatment
of age-based conditional exit incentives by the courts before the passage of the OWBPA, stressing that the courts' acceptance of these
incentives as simple noncoercive offers and their use of a vague standard of "voluntariness" to judge the enforceability of employee acceptance of the offers ignores the reality that has been highlighted in Part
I. Part III then returns to the OWBPA. It outlines the Act's treatment of exit incentives in general and draws conclusions about the
meaning of this treatment for conditional age-based exit incentive programs in particular. These conclusions include the strong inference
that Congress did not intend to authorize much stronger judicial regulation of these incentives than that given before the Betts decision.
Last, Part IV presents a theory of how Congress best could regulate
exit incentive windows to serve the antidiscrimination goals of the
ADEA without denying employers the discretion to grant the retirement benefits that they deem their employees to deserve.
I.

THE EFFECT OF CONDITIONAL AGE-BASED EXIT INCENTIVE
WINDOwS: THE CASE FOR REGULATION

A. ConditionalAge-Based Exit Incentives and the ADEA
Any pension plan that provides retirement benefits solely to
employees who have attained some minimum age encourages only
older workers to exit from employment and thus is in some tension
with the ADEA's goal "to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age.""x An employer that wants to
limit the number of employees above a certain age in its workforce
can be confident of doing so without discharging any older worker by
offering sufficiently attractive retirement benefits to any worker above
that age to induce most, or at least many of them, to choose retirement over work.
1129 U.S.C.

§ 621(b).
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Yet the antidiscrimination commands and purposes of the ADEA
need not and should not be read to condemn all retirement pensions.12
It is certainly clear that Congress never intended such a broad reading. The legislative history of the development of the ADEA indicates that Congress has been concerned about encouraging the
employment of older Americans who prefer a continuation of their
employment to the retirement options available to them. Congress
has been concerned about the inability of older workers who are displaced from jobs in which they are productive to find alternative
employment that utilizes their skills. 13 Congress has also asserted the
goal of avoiding public support of older workers who could effectively
support themselves if judged fairly as individuals rather than on the
basis of their age.14 Yet this goal has never moved Congress to
attempt to restrict retirement opportunities that older workers prefer
to continued work. This is confirmed by Congress's continued support of the public social security system, which, like any private pension plan, encourages at least some older workers to retire.1 5
12 Sections 4(a)(1) and (2) of the ADEA provide:
It shall be unlawful for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age....
29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
13 See, e.g., The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment, Report of
the Secretary of Labor to the Congress Under Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(June 1965), reprinted in EEOC, Legislative History of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act 5 (1981) [hereinafter Wirtz Report] (report of then Secretary of Labor Wirtz,
which led to the original passage of the ADEA, noting that age discrimination wastes a
"wealth of human resources"); id. at 18-19 (asserting that unemployment rates rise with age);
see also S. Rep. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967) (setting forth views of leading ADEA
sponsor, Senator Javits); 113 Cong. Rec. 34,742 (1967) (statement of Rep. Matsunaga).
14 See, e.g., Select Comm. on Aging, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Mandatory Retirement: The
Social and Human Cost of Enforced Idleness 23 (1977) (expressing concern that society will
not be able to support its retired members if the trend toward early retirement continues); 113
Cong. Rec. 34,744 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Hawkins); id. at 34,745 (1967) (remarks of Rep.
Eilberg).
Is Recent amendments to the social security law, however, have been framed to encourage
longer employment. See John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security Amendments of 1983:
Legislative History and Summary of Provisions, 46 Soc. Security Bull. 3, 7-48 (1983). The
1983 amendments provide that, beginning in 2003, the normal retirement age at which full
benefits can be obtained will climb one month per year until it reaches age 67 in 2027.
Furthermore, the benefit reduction that retirees must accept for taking the social security
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Nor were the ADEA's antidiscrimination goals broadened to
include the elimination of all retirement incentives by the clarification
in 1978 that the ADEA proscribes age-based terminations pursuant to

a retirement plan, regardless of how generous its terms. 16 Congress
had a narrower purpose in overturning the Supreme Court's judgment
in United Air Lines v. McMann 17 that the ADEA did not prohibit
age-based mandatory retirement. This purpose was to prevent
employers from leading employees into a retirement that they did not
prefer to continued employment, not to prevent employees from
choosing any attractive retirement made available to them.18
Congress also did not transform its general antidiscrimination goals
by the final removal in 1986 of the age cap on private sector workers
protected by the ADEA. 19 The elimination of the age cap means that
employers cannot use retirement or direct discharges to rid themselves of productive workers over forty, no matter how far beyond
forty they may be. It does not mean that employers cannot in any way
make retirement more attractive to workers who have attained some

high minimum age.
In contrast to the typical age-based pension plan, however, the use
of conditional age-based exit incentive programs does not simply
enable employers to encourage older employees to leave their jobs by
making the alternative of retirement more attractive than continued
system's early retirement option at age 62 will be increased from 20% to 30% by 2027. Social
Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983).
Inasmuch as the tendency of Americans to retire earlier seems as much influenced by
increases in the subsidization of early retirement through defined benefit plans as by the social
security system, it is not clear that Congress can encourage later retirement without greater
regulation of private pension plans. See Richard A. Ippolito, Toward Explaining Earlier
Retirement After 1970, 43 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 556 (1990); William J. Wiatrowski,
Supplementing Retirement Until Social Security Begins, Monthly Lab. Rev., Feb. 1990, at 25,
26. This may explain in part the 1986 congressional passage of a requirement that all pension
plans continue contributions and accruals without regard to an employee's age. See Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874 (1986). Plans can,
however, continue to cap defined benefit levels and "the number of years... which are taken
into account for purposes of determining benefit accrual." 29 U.S.C. § 623(i)(2).
16 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
§ 2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
17 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
18 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 528; S. Rep. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 504.
19 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592,
100 Stat. 3342 (1986).
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employment. Rather, employers can use these conditional incentive
windows to induce older workers to leave jobs they would prefer to
the retirement promised by the incentive benefits. Thus, conditional
age-based exit incentives can be used to achieve precisely what the
ADEA seeks to eradicate: the age-based elimination of productive
older workers who would prefer continued employment to retirement.
B.

Coercion and the Operation of Conditional
Age-Based Exit Incentives

Conditional age-based exit incentives can be surprisingly effective
in coercing older workers who may prefer to continue to work into
accepting early retirement. However, the use and effects of these
incentives are considerably more subtle than outright threats of discriminatory discharges based on age.
L

The Use of ConditionalExit Incentives to Induce Retirement

To understand how conditional exit incentive offers can be used to
induce retirement from employees who would prefer continued
employment, consider how a typical offer of this type would be
weighed by an offeree. Assume that an employer announces to its
workforce that because of general recessionary conditions or deep
cuts in the demand for its particular product, employment will have
to be cut by thirty percent over the next four months. The employer
also announces at the same time that in order to avoid as many involuntary layoffs as possible, it will offer retirement incentives to all
employees over the age of fifty-five. These incentives might include
some significant lump sum payment; they might include continued
health insurance coverage during at least some years of retirement; or
they might consist of the allowance of earlier or greater pension benefits, perhaps by crediting all those who accept the offer with additional
years of service or additional years of age to make them eligible for
increased retirement benefits under the employer's defined benefit
pension plan.20 The offer is conditional, however, because the benefits
20 These examples represent the typical structure of early retirement incentives. The Hewitt
Associates study, for instance, found that 64% of exit incentive programs augmented the
pension benefit (sometimes by eliminating the normal early retirement reduction), 23%
liberalized the requirements for pension elgibility, 51% provided for some cash payment, and
16% gave enhanced medical insurance coverage. See Hewitt Associates, supra note 8, at 9.
Bridge subsidies that would continue until social security eligibility have also been common.
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will only be granted to those who voluntarily retire within the next
two months. 21 Those offerees who are involuntarily laid off, or those
offerees who decide to retire after the expiration of the two month
period, will not obtain the benefits. Finally, assume that the employer
does not specify how it will determine who will be laid off to achieve
the necessary residual amount of reductions in staff after the closure
of the voluntary retirement window.
A post-fifty-five-year-old offeree in this typical exit window scenario might well rationally accept early retirement even though she prefers continuing employment. The reason is that the offeree must
include in her calculations the chance that she will be terminated
without the extra benefits offered for voluntary retirement. Thus, an
offeree who prefers employment to retirement with increased benefits
might prefer the latter to the perceived chance of continued employment plus the perceived chance of termination without enhanced benefits.22 Clearly it is the conditional nature of the retirement incentive
that makes the two preferences consistent, that, in other words, makes
it rational for an offeree to accept the incentive even though she prefers continued employment.23
This is highly significant for an employer wanting to rid itself of
more older workers than could be justified by individualized comparisons of the productivity of all its workers. For instance, assume an
employer wanted to cut a section of its workforce in half and that one
For a description of particular plans from major employers such as Exxon and Dupont, see
Meier, supra note 8, at 3-6.

Employers are somewhat restricted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") in structuring the form of their offered benefits. Because any plan designed to
provide retirement benefits is a pension plan under ERISA, employers must meet this Act's
requirements, including those prohibiting discrimination in favor of highly compensated
employees. See Larry I. Stein, Through the Looking Glass: An Analysis of Window Plans, 42
Lab. L.J. 665, 670-73 (1991).
21Open windows for a majority of conditional exit incentive plans last for one to three
months. See Bureau of Nat'l Af., Older Americans in the Workforce: Challenges & Solutions
65 (1987).
22 Expressed algebraically, where preferences for employment = E, preferences for
retirement = R, preferences for retirement with increased benefits = RIB, perceived chance
of continued employment = C, and perceived chance of termination without enhanced
benefits = (1.00-C)E > RIB, but RIB > C(E) + (1.00-C)R.
23 If the incentive offers were not conditional, or if any forced retirement would also come
with incentives, the two preferences would be contradictory. See supra note 22. If R = RIB,
then R > C(E) + (1.00 - C)R and R > C(E) + R - C(R) and 0 > C(E) - C(R) and R > E.
But E > RIB and if R = RIB, then E > R.

19931

Age-Based Exit Incentives

1279

half of the employees in this section were over fifty. Assume further
that the employer could eliminate half of these post-fifty-year-old

employees on the basis of individualized analyses of relative productivity. Also, assume that by offering a conditional incentive, the
employer could convince three-fourths of the post-fifty-year-olds to
accept retirement, even though many of these employees would prefer
continuing to work. Even if none of the other one-fourth that
declined retirement were vulnerable to discharge, the employer
increased by 50% (from 50% to 75%) the proportion of its older
workforce that it could displace. If the one fourth of the older workers that declined the retirement incentive were as likely to be vulnerable to termination based on their relative productivity as the threefourths that accepted the offer, the employer could increase from 50%
to 80% (a 60% increase) the proportion of terminations in its
workforce reduction drawn from its older workers.24
An employer is thus able to use an age-based retirement plan to
eliminate significantly more older workers than it could terminate by
individualized consideration of their productivity, despite the fact that
many of these older workers prefer continued employment.25 It is the
24 The retirement of 75% of the older workers enabled the employer to achieve the
retirement of 37.5% of the targeted workforce. The displacement of 12.5% more of the
original workforce would be necessary for the employer to achieve its 50% goal. If older
workers were as likely to be displaced as younger workers at this point, one fifth of the residual
12.5%, or 2.5%, would come from older workers. This would mean that 80% of the younger
workers would not be displaced and only 20% would be, while 80% of the older workers
would be displaced and only 20% would not be.
25 The assumptions made in this hypothetical are not unrealistic. The Hewitt Associates
study of exit incentive programs found that almost one fourth of the programs studied had
acceptance rates of over 75%. See Hewitt Assocs., supra note 8, at 8. Another study found
that the work performance of employees who accepted exit incentive offers was similar to that
of employees who declined such offers. See Larry Reibstein, AT&T Study Shows Early
Retirees Share a Range of Character Traits, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1987, at 17.
Furthermore, recent surveys of retired workers demonstrate that a substantial number are
willing and able to continue to work, including many who retired because of special benefit
incentives. See Employment Benefit Research Inst., Issue Brief: Economic Incentives for
Retirement in the Public and Private Sectors 5 (1986) (discussing 1981 survey by Louis Harris
and Associates); William McNaught, Michael C. Barth & Peter H. Henderson, The Human
Resource Potential of Americans Over 50, 28 Hum. Resources Mgmt. 455, 464-65 (1989)
(analyzing 1989 survey of retired workers by Louis Harris and Associates). Moreover, the
threat of layoff after declining a retirement incentive offer has proven to be a very real one.
Employers such as Combustion Engineering and Exxon have fired hundreds of employees after
exit incentive programs failed to reach their targets. See Bruce Nussbaum, Katheen Failla,
Christopher S. Eklund, Alex Beam, James R. Norman & Kathleen Deveny, The End of
Corporate Loyalty?, Bus. Wk., Aug. 4, 1986, at 42-49.
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critical interaction between the offer of additional benefits and the
threat of termination without these benefits that enables conditional
age-based exit incentives to eliminate older workers who could not be
induced to exit by either the offer of retirement incentives in tradi-

tional pension plans or the threat of forced terminations.2 6
2. The Philosophy of Coercion and ConditionalOffers

None of this should be surprising. Anyone offered an exchange
that he or she would prefer not to make may nonetheless accept the
offer if he or she perceives that the offeror probably has both the
power and will to obtain what he wants without giving anything in

return. 7 My willingness to sell my box lunch to a stranger on a
lonely mountain trail would be influenced by the stranger's size and
demeanor, as well as by my state of hunger and the offered purchase
price. The offer of some more than nominal price is important to my
calculations. I might sell the lunch at a reasonable price to a burly,
aggressive stranger without him directly threatening me, but I would
not give him the lunch without him at least beginning to exert physical force.
A philosopher might argue that the last example is misleading
because the hypothetical sale of my box lunch is coerced, whereas
acceptance of a conditional exit incentive is not. The argument would
26 It is clear that by magnifying the threat of increased layoffs an employer can boost the
number of acceptances of conditional exit incentives from employees who would prefer
continued work. Consider again the formula RIB > C(E) + (1.00 - C)R. See supra note 22.
This formula can be transformed into RIB > C(E) + R - C(R), then RIB. - R > C(E - R),
then RIB - R/ E - R > C. The lower the value of C, the more relative values of RIB and E,
for cases where employees prefer continued employment to enhanced retirement (E > RIB),
will satisfy this equation. The perceived chance of continued employment for those who
decline exit incentives (C) is in the control of any employer.
The value of RIB can also be controlled by employers. By increasing the value of the exit
incentives to a level that is still below the value of continued work for many employees, the
employer can reduce the threat necessary to achieve the retirement of many who would
continue to work. Through their control of these two variables, employers can balance several
different objectives: maximizing the retirement of those they could not legally discharge,
minimizing their outlay of funds, and insuring their threat of discharge is not so blatant as to
be illegal. See infra text accompanying notes 80-83.
27 A similar dynamic may cause corporate shareholders to tender their shares in response to
a takeover raider's tender offer even though they would prefer that the takeover failed. The
corporate shareholder may tender in such a situation because she fears that if the takeover
succeeds without her tendering, her shares may be worth much less than the tender offeror's
bid price. See Lucien A. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in
Corporate Takeovers, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1693, 1717-35 (1985).
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be that the stranger on the mountain could purchase my lunch only
by the threat of an action that he was not legally entitled to takeforceful conversion. By contrast, the employer in my typical scenario
obtains acceptance of its exit incentive offer from employees who
would prefer continued employment only by threatening to take
action that it is legally entitled to take-the discharge of relatively
unproductive employees during a period of retrenchment. Indeed, the
philosopher might argue that it is inappropriate to even denominate
as a threat the employer's description of the action the employer will

take after closure of the exit window.28 The philosopher might further wonder whether the law should be concerned about individuals
accepting exchanges not merely because of promised benefits, but also
partially because of the potential for adverse, but legal, consequences
if the exchanges are rejected.2 9

It may be inadequate to answer the philosopher by arguing that
descriptions of adverse consequences to which an offeree will be subject if he rejects an offer should be considered coercive threats whenever those consequences are not what the offeree would have expected
28 See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in Philosophy, Science, and Method 440 (Sidney
Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes & Morton White eds., 1969). This book has generated a rich
philosophical debate about the distinction between threats and offers. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg,
Harm to Self (1986); Alan Wertheimer, Coercion (1987); Harry G. Frankfurt, Coercion and
Moral Responsibility, in Essays on Freedom of Action 75 (Ted Honderich ed., 1973); Daniel
Lyons, Welcome Threats and Coercive Offers, 50 Phil. 425 (1975); Peter Westen, "Freedom"
and "Coercion"-Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 Duke L.J. 541 (1985); David
Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 121 (1981); see also Kenneth W.
Simons, Offers, Threats, and Unconstitutional Conditions, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 289 (1989)
(applying the theory of Nozick and his followers to the issue of acceptability of conditions on
constitutional rights).
The dominant view seems to be that whether a proposal should be treated as a coercive
threat rather than an offer should be determined by asking whether the proposal "threatens"
to make the recipient worse off relative to some appropriate baseline, or rather "offers" to
make the recipient better off relative to the baseline. Although differing in some important
ways, most accounts, including that of Nozick, suggest at least two alternative baselines, one
descriptive and one prescriptive: a coercive threat can be identified if the proposer wishes to
place the recipient in a position that is worse either than that in which he would expect to be in
the normal course of affairs, or than that in which he morally ought to be placed by the
proposer. See, e.g., Frankfurt, supra, at 69-71; Lyons, supra, at 436; Westen, supra, at 573-87.
29 Some writers have argued that offers can be coercive in particular circumstances, such as
when they conditionally offer something that the recipient does not want, but that is an
improvement on a very great evil that the recipient must avoid. See Feinberg, supra note 28, at
229-42; see also Zimmerman, supra note 28 (arguing generally that an offer is only coercive if
the proposer has itself prevented a preferred, preproposal situation from existing).
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based on past experience. 30 The typical exit incentive offer described
above tells offerees they will be in a worse position if they reject the
offer than they were in before the offer was made; they will be more
vulnerable to discharge. Yet this adverse effect would develop in the
hypothetical even if the employer had not made the offer. The
increased chance of discharge is not imposed to deter rejections of the
offer. Rather, the offers give older employees the opportunity to make
a bad situation, the increased chance of termination, somewhat better-if the offerees in fact view retirement with enhanced benefits as
better than employment with the increased odds of termination.31
The philosopher can nevertheless be answered in two ways. First,
offerees of age-based conditional exit incentives probably perceive
these offers to carry a promise of increased vulnerability not only to
discharges that are legal, but also to discharges that are not.32 The
threat of illegality indeed derives, at least in part, from the existence
of prohibitions on age discrimination. It would certainly be rational
for employees who are offered an expensive bribe for their jobs to
think that the employer would prefer that they not continue to work.
Employee-offerees who know that all employees past a certain age
have been offered that bribe might also surmise that their employer
wants to rid itself of older employees without individualized consideration of their relative productivity. Finally, these offerees might
rationally conclude that an employer with such a desire might carry
out promised discharges with some attention to age. Employees who
accept conditional exit incentive offers thus could be induced by
30 Robert Nozick defines a proposal as coercive if it would make the recipient worse off than

would the "normal... course of events." See Nozick, supra note 28, at 447. Several writers
have interpreted Nozick to mean the normal course of events that regularly occurred in the
period preceding the proposal. See Frankfurt, supra note 28, at 68-69; Westen, supra note 28,

at 579 n. 119; see also Feinberg, supra note 28, at 219-20 (interpreting Nozick to mean the
"statistically" normal set of circumstances that would have obtained absent the situation

generating the proposal).
31 Nozick stresses that a rational man would prefer to be given an offer but would not prefer
to be given a threat. See Nozick, supra note 28, at 461-62.
32 For Nozick and his commentators, the exit incentive proposal would be viewed as a

threat if the situation after the proposal is rejected falls below a normative baseline that is
defined by the morality of the society in which it is made. See supra note 28. Legality is at
least one aspect of any moral baseline used to define threats and coercion. Many people would
define many proposals to take certain actions well within the legal "right" of the proposer as
immoral and thus a coercive threat. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L.
Rev. 769, 793. Few, however, would accept a conditional proposal to take illegal action as
noncoercive.
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implied threats of illegal discharges, just as I could be induced to sell
my lunch on the mountain by an implied threat of forceful theft.33
The protection of legal rights is expensive and uncertain. Just as I
may not be able to prove my lunch was stolen, an employee may not
be able to prove his job was taken because of his age. The employer's
retirement incentive, like the mountain stranger's offered price for my
lunch, may seem more valuable than a highly contingent legal right of
action.

4

C. Conflict with the Principlesof the ADEA
Second and more important, even if age-based conditional exit
incentives are not viewed as coercive, they still undermine fulfillment
of the antidiscrimination purposes of the ADEA. Acceptances of
conditional age-based exit incentives enable employers to achieve
something condemned by the antidiscrimination provisions of the
ADEA-the elimination of employees because of age from jobs they
wish to continue to hold.

1. Age Discrimination
The condemnation by the ADEA's antidiscrimination principles of
even noncoerced acceptances of conditional age-based exit incentives
should be especially clear to the extent that such offers are driven by
age-based categorizations or stereotypes. We often regulate
exchanges that are driven by preferences that our society wishes to
condemn, 35 and the ADEA certainly reflects our society's collective
33 The offeree of an unconditional retirement plan of course may also feel threatened by the
announcement of imminent layoffs. If the plan offers benefits to those involuntarily terminated
as well as to those who retire before termination, however, there is no reason for the threat to
induce the retirement of those who prefer continued work.
34 This point is not diluted by the fact that the ADEA no doubt sometimes produces false
positives: erroneous findings of discrimination for discharges in fact not based on age. Even if
understood by an employee-offeree who fears future age discrimination, this fact would not
give the employee courage to resist a threatening exit incentive offer. The possibility that
nonmeritorious claims can be successful does not compensate for the risk that meritorious
claims may not be. Furthermore, an employer should be even more attracted to the use of
conditional age-based exit incentive offers by the possibility that they may reduce the incidence
of nonmeritorious as well as meritorious lawsuits.
35 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1129, 1152-53 (1986) (arguing that a democratic majority may decide that certain preferences,
such as those for discrimination, "should not be gratified-not only because of harm to others
or to the actor involved, but also because those preferences are.., not... defensible on
grounds other than self-interest").
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judgment that we should not honor preferences driven by age-based
stereotypes for the retirement of older workers.
2. Alternative Justificationsfor ConditionalAge-Based Exit
Incentives
It might, however, be argued that employers offer conditional exit
incentives only to older employees for reasons other than a desire to
eliminate older employees from their workforce without being subject
to ADEA claims. The employer offering the typical conditional exit
incentive described above, for instance, conceivably could have been
indifferent to whether the offer resulted in more older workers leaving
its workforce than would have been laid off under the age-neutral
standards that the employer intended to apply to meet its reduction in
force goals. The employer might have offered the extra benefits only
to older employees because it determined that only older employees
deserved and needed the extra benefits, and that simply discharging
productive older employees would threaten to impair the morale of
the remaining workforce. The employer might think that only older
workers, because of their age and the consequent greater difficulty in
obtaining alternative employment, have a special claim on the company to soften their termination.36 The employer might further
explain the limited window period for the additional benefits by
stressing that it is only the major cutbacks in jobs demanded at the
particular time of the offer that requires it to displace generally productive workers and that makes incumbent employee morale especially sensitive.
36 An employer's desire to give preferences to older workers should not pose a problem for
the ADEA's antidiscrimination principles. The ADEA was framed to avert discrimination
against workers because they are too old, not because they are too young. Indeed, the Act by

its terms only protects workers who are older than 40, and there are no ADEA decisions
finding preferences for older workers illegal. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). Unlike Title VII, the
ADEA's antidiscrimination commands should be read to run in only one direction. Compare

McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (interpreting Title VII to
protect white employees from discrimination) with Rock v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against
Discrimination, 424 N.E.2d 244, 246 (Mass. 1981) (construing Massachusetts statute similar
to the ADEA). But see Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1640,
1647 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (holding that the ADEA can be violated if one person within the
protected age group is given preference over another person within the protected age group),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (1991)

(providing that preferential treatment by an employer because of age as between employees
over 40 is unlawful).
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To be sure, this explanation of why the exit incentive offer is agebased does not explain why it also must be conditional. An employer
that was concerned about the future prospects of older employees
after a reduction in force or about the impact of older employee layoffs on incumbent employee morale should be willing to offer extra
retirement benefits to older employees who are involuntarily laid off,
as well as to those who retire.
There might also be a benign reason for this aspect of a window
plan, however. The benign explanation could not simply be that the
employer is unwilling to give extra benefits to a discharged older
worker who might force it to defend against an age discrimination
suit, even one that is not meritorious. An employer that wanted to
insure that a discharged older worker would not cost both extra
retirement benefits and the amount necessary to defeat an invalid age
discrimination claim could make the grant of the retirement benefits
to a discharged employee dependent on the employee's willingness to
waive any ADEA claim against her completed termination. However, an employer could argue that even a discharged employee who is
willing to waive her ADEA claims has forced the employer to spend
funds that would have been saved had she voluntarily resigned: those
funds needed for evaluation of her individual worth to the company.
The employer thus might defend the conditional nature of the exit
incentive by claiming that although it wants to give more to older
employees, it does not want to expend on any worker the costs of both
extra benefits and an individual evaluation.
Even if plausible for some conditional age-based exit incentives,
these explanations, however, are not adequate to reconcile these
incentives with the ADEA's antidiscrimination commands and goals.
Employment discrimination law generally does not excuse disparate
treatment of a status group simply because the disparate treatment
may have a benign motivation.37 Disparate treatment, at least when
37 See UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1203-04 (1991) (proscribing benignly
motivated sex-based fetal protection policies and stating that "the absence of a malevolent
motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a
discriminatory effect"). Consider also the Supreme Court's prohibition of sex-based pension
plans. See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983); Los Angeles Dep't of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
The primary exception to the general rule against discrimination both in the ADEA and in
Title VII is the bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ"). Congress, however, intended
this exception to be interpreted narrowly not to allow even cost-based defenses to disparate
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there are attendant disfavored effects, is proscribed regardless of the
state-of-mind of the employer."8 Age-based exit incentive offers constitute disparate treatment of older workers and the effect of these
offers (the displacement of older workers who prefer continuing to
work) is contrary to the goals of the ADEA. It is therefore not clear
why such offers should be legally acceptable simply because they may
have benign motivations.3 9

Furthermore, even if some conditional age-based exit incentive windows might have benign motivations, it seems likely that most are at
least in part driven by a desire to move older employees out of the
workforce without the threat of age discrimination challenges. It may
be revealing that conditional age-based exit incentives became popular
only in the wake of the ADEA's prohibition of age discrimination,
and especially after congressional clarification that forced retirement
is illegally discriminatory. 4° The passage and elaboration of the

ADEA would not have influenced employers who only want to give
treatment in employment. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1209. The Johnson Controls Court
held that the Title VII BFOQ defense should be applied "as narrowly" as the BFOQ provision
in the ADEA was applied in Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985). Johnson
Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1204. An employer claiming a BFOQ must be able to establish that it
"'had reasonable cause to believe . . . that all or substantially all [persons over the age
qualifications] would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job
involved,'" or the "employer could establish that age was a legitimate proxy for the safetyrelated job qualifications by proving that it is 'impossible or highly impractical' to deal with the
older employees on an individualized basis." Criswell, 472 U.S. at 414 (quoting Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 & n. 5 (5th Cir. 1969)). This defense
therefore would only help to insulate from challenge an age-based exit incentive program
where the employer could establish either that all or substantially all the older offerees could
no longer perform their job, or that it was highly impractical to determine which of the offerees
were exceptions to such a generalization.
38 The approval of certain voluntary affirmative action plans by the Court does not
challenge the proposition that benign motivation cannot excuse disparate treatment. See
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 192 (1979). These decisions can be explained by the Court's
determination that the effects of affirmative action plans can serve, rather than undermine, the
ultimate goals of Title VII.
39 Also, judicial and legislative rejection of prospective waivers of rights to be free from
status discrimination is not limited to waivers obtained by employers who intend to
discriminate. See infra text accompanying notes 62-64. The use of prospective waivers is also
proscribed for those who just wish to divert to more constructive purposes funds that might be
expended on the defense of invalid charges of discrimination.
40 See supra note 8; cef.Olivia S. Mitchell & Rebecca A. Luzadis, Changes in Pension
Incentives Through Time, 42 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 100 (1988) (finding an empirical shift in
pension plans toward rewarding early, rather than delayed, retirement, perhaps in response to
develoments in the ADEA).
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some older employees the opportunity for increased severance
benefits.
3.

"Rational"Age Discrimination:Economic Justifications

Moreover, further analysis suggests that employers have strong reasons for wanting to displace older workers, especially during periods
of substantial force reductions. Admittedly, most managerial decisionmakers are not likely to have the kind of animus toward older
workers that has fueled racism and sexism at all levels of our society.41 Managers are likely, however, to be influenced by the stereotypes regarding the capabilities of older workers that were the
primary concern of the Congress that enacted the ADEA. 42 Many of
these stereotypes are more powerful because they may contain an element of truth: for many jobs, at least at some age, average productiv43
ity starts to decline.
In some situations it therefore may be economically rational for an
employer to use age as a proxy for productivity, rather than to incur
the costs of individual evaluations, including those costs engendered
by employee anxieties. It may also be economically rational for an
employer to want a reduction in force to remove productive older
41 Nevertheless, some age-based discrimination by younger management may be the
unconscious product of unresolved child-parent conflicts, rather than a failure to empathize
with older workers. See Martin L. Levine, Age Discrimination and the Mandatory Retirement
Controversy 133-45 (1988).
42 See Wirtz Report, supra note 13. It is interesting that 20% of the employers in the
Hewitt Associates study stated that one of the reasons for offering their plans was to give
"career opportunities" to "younger employees." See Hewitt Assocs., supra note 8, at 5.
Historians have correlated the spread of age-based thinking in the last century with the
rationalization of modem society and the need for new organizing principles for social control
as traditional family and community structures have eroded. See, e.g., Howard P. Chudacoff,
How Old Are You? Age Consciousness in American Culture 184-85 (1989); Levine, supra note
41, at 75-94.
43 For some jobs, however, even generalizations about age-related productivity decline may
be inaccurate. For instance, some recent studies suggest that discriminating in favor of older
workers in some jobs may be efficient because of lower turnover, absenteeism, and pilferage.
See ICF Inc., Study for The Commonwealth Fund's Americans Over 55 At Work Program 6
(1991); see also Levine, supra note 41, at 108 (summarizing research and concluding that it has
"failed to show a great overall decline in job performance at about typical retirement age");
Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 88 Yale L.J. 565, 576 (1979) (citing studies showing "an absence of
meaningful connection between advancing age and declining levels of job performance" in
most industries); Daniel Goleman, The Aging Mind Proves Capable of Lifelong Growth, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 21, 1984, at Cl.
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workers rather than equally productive younger workers, because
both the projected future average productivity and the projected
future average job tenure of the younger workers may be higher. Job
tenure may be especially important if training and other turnover
costs are significant. An employer may be particularly concerned that
a reduction in force by reverse seniority that results in the displacement of only younger workers could generate especially high turnover
costs when the remaining older workers later retire during the same
period.
Some might argue that our society should not condemn such economically rational "statistical" discrimination against older workers.' Permitting employers to justify age-based generalizations
because they are economically rational would seriously compromise
the ADEA's promise of individualized consideration regardless of
age, however. Therefore, it is not surprising that the ADEA, like
Title VII, has been read to condemn all decisionmaking that is unnecessarily based on stereotypes or generalizations, whether or not economically rational.45 It is inconsistent to condone incentives that
induce unwanted retirement even if they have such a rational basis.
An economically rational employer may also want to get rid of
older workers whose productivity is equal to that of younger workers
because the average pay of the older workers is higher. Older employees may have generally higher wages relative to marginal productivity
because there is an implied "life-cycle" agreement to pay wages above
marginal productivity, as well as above the opportunity wage in the
external labor market, at the end of a long tenure to compensate for
44 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Models of Job Discrimination, Some Mathematical Models of
Race in the Labor Market, in Racial Discrimination in Economic Life 83, 187 (Anthony H.
Pascal ed., 1973); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 Am.
Econ. Rev. 659 (1972). For an application of statistical arguments to age discrimination, see
Robert Hutchens, Delayed Payment Contracts and a Firm's Propensity to Hire Older
Workers, 4 J. Lab. Econ. 439 (1986).
45 See, e.g., EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1983);
Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
1007 (1982); Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp. 939, 953 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 770 F.2d 12 (2d
Cir. 1985) (all holding that economic justifications for age discrimination are not acceptable
under ADEA); see also supra note 37 (discussing BFOQ defense). But cf. Laugesen v.
Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 n.4 (6th Cir. 1975) (noting that a committee report on the
ADEA suggests that the Act should not be read to "'prevent an employer from achieving a
reasonable age balance in his employment structure' ") (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967), reprintedin 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2219), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1045 (1975).
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wages below marginal productivity paid in the earlier stages of
employment.' Such long-term implied contracts may be attractive to
employers because they discourage "worker shirking and malfea-

sance," and because they induce commitments to the firm that reduce
personnel turnover costs and encourage interemployee cooperation
and training.4 7 They may be attractive to employees who appreciate

being able to rely on a rising wage curve as they age and who may
share in the returns from their workforce's greater efficiency. Such
long-term commitments traditionally have not been enforceable in
court, but worries about reputational costs and incumbent employee

morale normally deter employers from opportunistic breaches.48
Such concerns may not be sufficient deterrence, however, during
reductions in force when employers need to be less sensitive to their
external reputations and when incumbent employees are focused on
job preservation rather than promises of wage enhancement. During
such periods employers may want to take the opportunity to eliminate
higher paid older workers. 49

Doing so by laying off older workers without individualized consideration of their productivity relative to their wage, however, clearly
46 There is now an extensive theoretical literature based on the assumed importance of
implied delayed payment contracts. See, e.g., Robert M. Hutchens, A Test of Lazear's Theory
of Delayed Payment Contracts, 5 J. Lab. Econ. S153 (1987); Edward P. Lazear, Agency,
Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 606 (1981); James
L. Medoff & Katharine G. Abraham, Are Those Paid More Really More Productive? The
Case of Experience, 16 J. Hum. Resources 186 (1981); Michael L. Wachter & George M.
Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to
the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349,
1360-64 (1988).
47 See Robert M. Hutchens, Do Job Opportunities Decline with Age?, 42 Indus. & Lab.
Rel. Rev. 89, 90 (1988).
48 However, similar express commitments to unionized employees, as embodied in collective
bargaining agreements through wage scales, competitive seniority provisions governing layoffs
in reductions in force, and protections from discharge without just cause, have been
enforceable. See generally Wachter & Cohen, supra note 46 (describing a variety of collective
bargaining agreements enforced by the courts).
In addition, some recent state law protecting nonunion employees from bad faith discharge
can be viewed as achieving the enforcement of implied long-term employment contracts. See,
e.g., Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (1992); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765
P.2d 373 (1988).
49 Cf. Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 254 (Ist Cir. 1986) (" '[T]he
company took steps to ease people out on retirement, which to me involved age. We didn't
want to spend the money to retrain them and go on.' ") (quoting testimony of management
supervisor in ADEA litigation).
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contravenes the antidiscrimination commands of the ADEA. 50
Whether or not it should be illegal for an employer to impact older
workers disparately by discharging everyone in a particular job making more than some set figure, there is no authority to support the
legality of discharging everyone beyond some maximum age because
of the average wage of workers beyond that age.51 Any calculated
effort to use conditional exit incentives to achieve the same result
should also be unacceptable under the ADEA.

4.

Worker Preferencesfor ConditionalAge-Based Exit Incentives
It is true that some acceptances of conditional age-based exit incentives reflect uncoerced preferences for retirement plus extra benefits
over continued employment. Moreover, many employees who receive
special retirement benefits through exit incentive programs would
have been laid off without any extra benefits had their employer not
been able to offer any such program. Nevertheless, neither the ex ante
50 EEOC Guidelines provide that a "differentiation based on the average cost of employing
older employees as a group is unlawful." 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(f) (1992).
51 Some lower courts have interpreted the ADEA to prohibit the disparate impact resulting
from the refusal of continued employment to those who are paid more because of longer
service. See, e.g., Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945
(1981); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983); see also Note,
supra note 43 (discussing disparate impact analysis in this situation).
These decisions, which do not permit a cost reduction defense, seem to expand disparate
impact theory to condemn generalizations based on status closely associated with age, such as
seniority, when individual consideration would be feasible. See Alfred W. Blumrosen,
Interpreting the ADEA: Intent of Impact, in Age Discrimination in Employment Act: A
Compliance and Litigation Manual for Lawyers and Personnel Practitioners 68, 106-07, 11115 (Monte B. Lake ed., 1982); Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate
Impact, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 229 (1990); Mark A.
Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Is a
Transplant Appropriate?, 14 U. Tol. L. Rev. 1261 (1983).
A Seventh Circuit decision seems to take the further step of condemning the discharge of an
older worker after individualized consideration of whether his present contributions to the firm
justifies his high salary. See Metz v. Transit Mix, 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987). In Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 61 U.S.L.W. 4323 (Apr. 20, 1993), however, the Supreme Court rejected
the Metz decision by holding that an employer's discharge of an employee because of a factor
that is highly correlated with age, such as seniority, does not constitute actionable disparate
treatment under the ADEA. Furthermore, the Hazen majority expressly reserved judgment
on whether the ADEA encompasses any disparate impact claims. Justice Kennedy, in a
dissenting opinion, noted that "there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry
over disparate impact from Title VII to the ADEA." Id. at 4325, 4327 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see also Geller v. Markham, 451 U.S. 945, 948 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (stating that "[tihis Court has never held that proof of discriminatory
impact can establish a violation of the ADEA").
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preferences of those who accept exit incentives nor the ex post benefits
of some such offers should justify the discriminatory effects of the
offers on those who are induced to accept them in part because of a
threat of a layoff that could never have been legally implemented. In
the first place, in no other context has antidiscrimination law accepted
the disadvantaging of some protected status group members by overt
disparate treatment simply because that disparate treatment results in
the advantaging of others.52
Second, the rejection of mandatory retirement seems to have been
based in part on the general principle that the interests of some workers cannot justify discrimination against others. 3 Congress might
have continued to permit mandatory retirement of employees older
than some maximum age. Congress might have determined that permitting mandatory retirement plans would encourage employers to
pay wages above marginal productivity for a limited period of time at
the end of a long-term employment relationship by allowing them to
avoid unbounded periods of wage payments in excess of productivity.5 4 It might also have determined that a mandatory retirement
52 Consider, for instance, some hard Title VII cases. In Arizona Governing Comm. v.
Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983), the Supreme Court held that employers are prohibited from
offering sex-based pension annuities that provide lower annual benefits to women, even though
the prohibition might result in the denial of the annuity option to all employees and clearly
will result in the class of men taking proportionately less from their pension accounts than the
amounts they contributed. Id. at 1079-86. In UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196
(1991), the Court interpreted the BFOQ defense narrowly to hold that employers cannot
exclude women from jobs that are particulary hazardous to themselves or their unborn
children. Id. at 1205. Finally, in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), the Court held that
even a facially neutral employment test cannot be utilized because of its disparate impact on
blacks when the test does not have a business-related justification, even when the test is
accompanied by an affirmative action plan that advantages more members of the protected
class than are disadvantaged by the challenged practice. Id. at 445-56.
53 See Select Comm. on Aging, supra note 14, at 39 (rejecting argument that collectively
bargained mandatory retirement should be permitted, because perceived interests of the
majority of workers cannot justify discrimination against the minority). The ADEA was
amended in the next year to prohibit all forms of mandatory retirement. See Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat.
189.
54 See Edward P. Lazear, Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 1261
(1979). The theory that employers pay older, long-term workers above their productivity,
however, has not been empirically established and has been questioned by some researchers.
See Peter Kuhn, Wages, Effort, and Incentive Compatibility, 4 J. Lab. Econ. 28 (1986). In
addition, Martin Levine has suggested that employers could adjust to the prohibition of
mandatory retirement by only paying above productivity until the age that the average
employee voluntarily retires. See Levine, supra note 41, at 58.
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option would limit stigmatization of some workers who are evaluated
as unproductive at the end of their careers. 55 By directly prohibiting
any form of mandatory retirement and by eliminating any cap on the
ADEA protected class, Congress thus seems to have made the judgment that the right of all older workers to individualized considera-

tion of their productivity must outweigh any economic or
psychological benefits that some subset of workers may derive from
mandatory retirement schemes.
There are several reasons to discount the ex ante expressions of
employee preferences for conditional exit incentives, even if it is
assumed that these preferences have not been coerced by an implicit
threat of illegal discharge. First, we are sometimes hesitant to force
people to accept choices they must make in a position of relative ignorance of probable consequences.5 6 The assumption that individuals
know what is best for them and should not be second-guessed is weak-

est when these individuals do not have critical information about their
alternatives. Offerees of exit incentives may be in such a position of
ignorance, especially if they are told little about their particular standing with their employer and thus cannot judge the likelihood of their
involuntary dismissal. Offerees may also be ignorant of their legal
rights or the likely consequences of retirement under the offered
incentives.5 7
55 See Richard Epstein, Forbidden Grounds 458 (1992); see also Levine, supra note 41, at
35 (explaining that mandatory retirement is not justified by the avoidance of stigmatization of
some workers because the right to be considered as an individual free of discrimination cannot
be sacrificed). In any event, the concern that the elimination of mandatory retirement
increases the likelihood of potentially stigmatizing evaluations of older workers may be
misplaced. Department of Labor studies indicate that firms that used mandatory retirement
before it was prohibited were more likely to formally evaluate the performance of older
workers. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Final Report to Congress on Age Discrimination in
Employment Act Studies 26 (1982).
56 Cf. Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace 75 (1990) (suggesting that lack of
information in the private labor market may justify public policy intervention); Sunstein, supra
note 35, at 1166 (discussing the pros and cons of government intervention in light of an
"absence of information"); Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the
Standard Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 101, 127-29 (1988)
(describing the argument from "imperfect information" in favor of government intervention).
57 Absent compulsory disclosure, offeree ignorance is likely to be the normal case because
there is no incentive to fully inform when employers hope to induce resignations without direct
discharges. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 3 J. Legal Stud. 205, 211
(1973) (arguing that products liability law may be efficient because it provides consumers with
the cost-justified protection they would want if sellers had fully informed them of risks); Note,
Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in
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Second, we often regulate bilateral trades because of their external
effects on third parties or society in general. Although the concerns
expressed in the legislative history of the ADEA about the social burdens of supporting an increasingly elderly populous whose productivity is not fully utilized5 8 were not intended to prevent the provision of
attractive retirement benefits, these issues seem relevant to the question of whether retirement bargains induced by fear of even legal discharges should be regulated.5 9 Furthermore, antidiscrimination laws
like the ADEA may condemn any status-based actions-including
those resulting from voluntary bargains-that perpetuate stereotypes,
such as the lack of productivity of the elderly, that generate further
cycles of prejudice throughout the society. The retirement of even
productive workers who would prefer to continue to work could support stereotypes about the desire and capacity of older workers.
Good Faith, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1816, 1831-33 (1980) (arguing that common law protection
against unjust dismissal would provide employees the security they would purchase if
companies had adequate incentive to provide complete information about the risks of
discharge).
Of course, offerees of exit incentives, like employees contemplating seeking contractual
protection from discharge, theoretically could insist on obtaining more information about their
choice. The decision to reject their ex ante preferences about information would thus have to
be based in part on paternalistic or distributive, as well as efficiency, justifications. See Duncan
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 597-603
(1982).
58 These social burdens are real. Department of Labor data indicate that even older
workers who do not drop out of the workforce altogether are more likely to be unemployed for
longer periods than are younger unemployed workers. See Meier, supra note 8, at 21. This
should not be surprising. Unemployed older workers typically have less mobility than
unemployed younger workers. It is usually more efficient for employers to discriminate
against older job applicants who they do not know than it is to discriminate against older
incumbent workers who they do know and who have already undergone firm-specific training.
See Hutchens, supra note 47, at 91.
59 An additional reason why we regulate transactions may also be relevant to at least some
exit incentive offers. Based upon wisdom gained from collective experience, we are sometimes
paternalistic toward even those who act with full information. One basis for paternalism is a
pattern of myopia from individuals who regularly overdiscount the future when making
particular choices and live to regret it. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1164; Weiler, supra note
56, at 74; Willborn, supra note 56, at 128 (all noting the problem of undervaluation).
This is perhaps most likely to be true for immediate lump sum payments, which may entice
the acceptance of early retirement from workers who come to regret their decision soon after
their bonus is dissipated. However, it could be true for any early retirement, which may
ultimately lead to retirees having lower annual benefits than they would have had had they
been able to work to a normal retirement age. See Meier, supra note 8, at 24.
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D. ConditionalAge-Based Exit Incentives and Prospective Waiver
of ADEA Rights
Finally, a cogent argument that the fulfillment of the antidiscrimination promises of the ADEA requires regulation of even the
noncoerced acceptance of conditional age-based exit incentive offers
can be based on an appreciation of how acceptance functions as a
prospective waiver of ADEA rights, and of why Congress and the
courts have resisted prospective waivers of antidiscrimination guarantees. Acceptance of conditional exit incentive offers functions as a
prospective waiver of ADEA rights both from the perspective of
employee-offerees and from that of employer-offerors.
Consider first the perspective of the offerees. As suggested above,
employees within the ADEA's post-forty-year-old protected class
may accept a conditional exit offer because of the fear of future agebased terminations without extra benefits. They may do so in part
because they are unaware of or uncertain about the protection the
ADEA would afford against some possible future termination. Moreover, even if an accepting employee fears only a legal discharge, the
acceptance means that the ADEA cannot be applied in evaluation of
any possible future termination of employment.
The functional equivalence of a conditional exit incentive with the
waiver of ADEA rights is even more clear from the perspective of an
employer who wants to effect the removal of an employee because of
age. The retirement incentive enables such an employer to accomplish its age-based goals without worrying about an ADEA challenge.
The employee's resignation obviates a future age-based discharge.'
Leaving that resignation unregulated seems especially anomalous
because even waivers of ADEA claims against completed terminations are subject to regulatory oversight.61 There is no clear reason
why an employer should be able to insulate its disparate treatment of
an older employee more easily by explicitly or implicitly telling that
employee that she might be fired and can obtain a bonus by resigning
instead, than by firing the employee and then telling her that she will
60 It thus should not be surprising that attorneys advise employers to implement conditional
exit incentive programs to avoid the risks of litigation. See, e.g., Joel L. Finger, Age
Discrimination Problems in the Context of a Reduction in Work Force 18 (1983); Paul T.
Shultz & Cheryl D. Fells, Current Developments in Employee Benefits, 8 Employee Rel. L.J.

325, 334 (1982).
61 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(0.
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receive higher severance pay if she signs a release of any right to sue
for her discharge.
In fact, Congress and the courts have understood that waivers of
future protection against possible acts of discrimination should be disfavored relative to releases from liability for past discriminatory acts.
Indeed, although the OWBPA permits some waivers of ADEA claims
against past discrimination if they meet specific standards for being
"knowing and voluntary," it unequivocally prohibits any waiver of
"rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is executed."' 62 This prohibition only confirms pre-OWBPA judicial decisions that never suggested that prospective waiver should be
permissible. ADEA law on prospective waiver is also in conformity
with the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co. 63 that "there can be no prospective waiver of an
employee's rights under Title VII," although voluntary and knowing
settlements of matured discrimination claims are acceptable.6
The functional equivalence of the acceptance of conditional exit
incentives with prospective waivers is confirmed by an analysis of the
reasons why Congress and the courts might sensibly want to prohibit
prospective waivers. For heuristic purposes, I shall contrast the polar
context for waiver of a legal right: the settlement of an initiated lawsuit. Why might we permit a defendant employer to purchase a plaintiff's lawsuit via settlement, but not permit that same employer to
purchase, perhaps through paying additional wages, an employee's
right to bring a claim against future discrimination? Some of the reasons for regulating private bargains noted above may suggest answers.
First, we can be more comfortable with an employee's ability to
understand and protect her own interests at the settlement of a lawsuit. After commencement of a suit, an employee is in a much better
position to understand what she is trading. She is probably represented by an attorney; she is focusing on a particular act or course of
discrimination; and she has had an opportunity to collect information
Id. § 626(f)(1)(C).
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Id. at 51. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991), the Court
did qualify the Alexander decision by holding that individual employees could prospectively
trade the judicial forum promised by the ADEA for an arbital forum. Regardless of the
importance of this decision for the waivability of the ADEA procedural system, however, there
is no suggestion in Gilmer that a federal substantive antidiscrimination right could be waived
prospectively. Id. at 1652.
62
63
64
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on exactly what happened. The employee who waives her right to sue
prospectively, by contrast, knows little of what she is giving up. She
can only speculate on whether and the extent to which the employer
is likely to discriminate. She can only guess how likely it is that she
could prove any discrimination that does ensue.
Furthermore, an employee who waives her rights prospectively is
less likely to anticipate her long-term interests and thus is more needful of paternalism. 65 An employee who waives her rights to be free of
discrimination at the outset of employment may be blinded by her
need for a job and the immediate prospect of a higher salary. Any
form of future discrimination, especially age discrimination if she is
young at the time of waiver, is contingent and may only occur much
later. After discrimination has occurred, the likelihood of myopia is
reduced.66
Second, prospective waivers, unlike settlements, can be viewed as
undermining the goals of statutes that regulate market relationships
to reduce the occurrence of activity condemned as intrinsically bad.
A settlement not only avoids costly litigation, but also to some degree
penalizes a defendant who may have been guilty of a bad act and at
least partially compensates a plaintiff who may have been a victim of
this act. A settlement thus generally discourages rather than encourages future acts of discrimination. By contrast, the prospective sale of
a right to be free of discrimination primarily facilitates future acts of
discrimination. The employer who has purchased the right to discriminate is surely more likely to indulge discriminatory
preferences. 67

This perspective may distort the actual disincentives to discriminate created by the allowance of prospective waivers because an
employer would have to take into account the costs of purchasing a
waiver before using it to indulge its taste for discrimination, just as an
employer must take into account possible litigation costs, including
settlement costs, before discriminating without the immunity that
would be provided by a valid waiver. Yet there are good reasons to
think that it would be cheaper for employers to purchase discrimina65 See supra note 59.

66 However, given the glitter of a lump-sum bonus, it is not eliminated.
67 Moreover, it also might be argued that this process would undermine the moral force of
the waived prohibition. See Judith A. McMorrow, Who Owns Rights: Waiving and Settling
Private Rights of Action, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 429, 462 (1989).
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tion through prospective waivers than through settlements. First, for
the reasons stated above, employees would be much more likely to
undervalue their protection from future discrimination than their protection from discrimination that has already occurred. Second,
employers that are satisfied with having the discretion to discriminate
against only a segment of those within a protected status group, such
as older employees, can reduce the costs of discrimination by purchasing waivers through bids calibrated to attract only employees who
place the lowest value on their protection from discrimination. If

trades of protection from discrimination can only occur after a discriminatory act, employers can only guess which employees it can

most cheaply subject to discrimination because they would sell their
protection at the lowest price. Third, the longer an employer must
wait to purchase the discretion to discriminate, the more legal, administrative, evaluative, and reputational costs it must incur in addition

to those necessary to pay off an employee.6" Clearly, the discretion to
discriminate can be purchased most cheaply before any discriminatory act has occurred. Conditional retirement incentive offers can
identify those employees who will sell their ADEA protection most
cheaply, and such offers can avoid any costs of evaluation, reputation,
and litigation that would have to be incurred before securing postdischarge settlements.6 9

In sum, the unregulated allowance of conditional age-based exit
incentive windows is inconsistent with the antidiscrimination principles of the ADEA. These incentives may cause the retirement of
workers who prefer the continuation of work. They do so by what
68 It would also be more expensive to induce the plaintiff to settle after the plaintiff has
incurred the costs of litigation. The plaintiff would probably not consider the avoidance of
these costs when comparing the value of settlement with the value of the right to litigate.
69 This analysis also suggests that there is more reason to regulate waivers of protection
from discrimination immediately after potentially discriminatory terminations than there is to
regulate settlements that occur later, after the commencement of litigation. The former
waivers are closer to the middle of the spectrum; those sacrificing rights have less information
than they would have after filing some claim, and the costs of achieving immunity from suit
are less for an employer before the filing of a claim. This helps explain the greater attention
given by Congress to nonprospective waivers of ADEA rights than to nonprospective waivers
of Title VII rights. ADEA waivers have more typically been employer-initiated and effected
immediately after termination before commencement of any lawsuit. See infra text
accompanying notes 167-68; Amy Wax, Note, Waiver of Rights Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1067, 1082-84 (1986); see also
McMorrow, supra note 67, at 456-59 (noting the public deterrent and educative effects of the
publication of lawsuits as an added reason to closely scrutinize prelitigation waivers).
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most would consider at least an implicit threat of termination, perhaps illegal termination, without an enhancement of benefits. They
also may effect the waiver of what would have been the future protection of the ADEA, and by doing so enable an employer to eliminate
employees from its workforce on the basis of age without facing the
possibility of claims of discriminatory discharge. Early retirement
incentives have become especially popular in the past two decades
and, without adequate regulation, probably will continue to be so, as
employers appreciate that such incentives can indirectly achieve the
sometimes economically rational age discrimination that the ADEA
directly prohibits.
II.

AGE-BASED CONDITIONAL EXIT INCENTIVE WINDOWS
IN THE COURTS

Prior to passage of the OWBPA, a number of older workers who
had come to regret their retirements pursuant to conditional exit
incentive windows tried to use the ADEA to challenge these windows. None of these challenges, however, resulted in judicial recognition of how conditional windows conflict with the purposes of the
ADEA. The lower federal courts instead developed basically two
approaches to the treatment of the challenges, each blind to how conditional windows are used both to displace older workers who would
prefer not to retire and to secure from these workers the sacrifice of
the protections of the ADEA.
A.

The Constructive DischargeApproach

The Seventh Circuit's decision in Henn v. NationalGeographicSociety70 represents the majority approach to these challenges. Robert
Henn and three other plaintiffs challenged the Geographic Society's
securing of their retirements through an incentive offer made to all
advertisement salespersons older than fifty-five. The offer was generous, consisting of "a severance payment of one year's salary, retirement benefits calculated as if the retiree had quit at 65, medical
coverage for life as if the employee were still on the payroll, and some
supplemental life insurance coverage." 71 It was, however, conditioned on the salesperson's retiring within two months of the original
70

71

819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987).
Id. at 826.
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offer date and was described as a "one-time opportunity."' 72 The
plaintiffs testified that they accepted the offer because they feared they
would lose both their jobs and the extra benefits if they declined. The
plaintiffs had apparently been criticized for their recent performance,
and Henn stated that his supervisor had told him that "'[s]ome of
you older guys will not be around at the end of the year.' ,73 The
plaintiffs claimed they became more nervous during the window
period because their superiors would not tell them whether they
should accept the offer.
During the company's decisionmaking process that resulted in the
retirement offer, a memorandum was produced that stressed the aging
of the sales force and concluded that older salespersons should be
fired. It stated that
"[ilf an age balance is not struck soon our average age will obviously
increase. Serious repercussions will result if younger sales personnel
are not available to cultivate clients in new growth industries and
insure future sales. To attract youthful qualified sales personnel we
must be cognizant of industry practices and offer required
incentives."'74

The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook,
upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Society. In
Easterbrook's view, employees who accept early retirement incentives
can challenge under the ADEA only those working conditions they
would have confronted as the alternative to retirement. Thus, "the
appropriate question in early retirement cases" is "whether the
existing conditions (ignoring the offer of early retirement) violate the
ADEA. If they do, then the employee may recover for that violation
whether or not he took the package of benefits (though the value of
the package would be taken into account in computing damages). 75
Furthermore, the standard for determining whether the alternative
or existing conditions violate the ADEA is one of constructive discharge: "Only a constructive discharge, where an actual discharge
would violate the ADEA, supports a claim of the sort plaintiffs pursue." 76 To satisfy such a standard, a plaintiff must show that the
72

73

Id.
Id. at 830.

74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.

(quoting employer's internal memorandum).
at 829.
at 826.
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employer has made its working conditions "so intolerable" that a reasonable employee would think he had no alternative but to resign.77
Judge Easterbrook agreed with the trial court that Henn and his fellow plaintiffs had not been constructively discharged. Easterbrook
also concurred that "dark hints" of "unpleasant consequences" if performance standards are not met go "with the territory" of being a
salesperson,78 and concluded that no reasonable jury could find that
the Society had, or would have, treated the plaintiffs so poorly as to
79
force their resignation.
This constructive discharge approach to claims like those in Henn
has been accepted by numerous lower courts.8 0 Furthermore, there
seems to be little to fault in Judge Easterbrook's application of the
doctrine. Ignoring the offer of early retirement, the Henn plaintiffs
did not show that the Society had created or would create a working
situation so intolerable for plaintiffs as to make their resignations reasonable. Absent the offer of early retirement, reasonable salespersons
who wanted to continue to work would not resign simply because
they were threatened with discharge if their performance did not
improve dramatically. Moreover, even if the "dark hints" were considered sufficient to induce reasonable resignations, without a record
of actual discharges it would be very difficult to prove that resignations were forced on the basis of age rather than on the basis of
performance.81
77 This is the general objective constructive discharge standard employed by most lower
courts. See, e.g., Lewis v. Federal Prison Indus., 786 F.2d 1537, 1542-43 n.4 (Ilth Cir. 1986);
Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887-88 (3rd Cir. 1984); Pena v. Brattleboro
Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983). A number of lower courts have also required
plaintiffs claiming constructive discharge to prove that the employer intentionally coerced the
resignation. See, e.g., Bartman v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 799 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1092 (1987); Bristow v. Daily Press, 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256

(8th Cir. 1981).
78 Henn, 819 F.2d at 826.
79 Id. at 830.

80 See, e.g., Gray v. York Newspaper, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1082 (3rd Cir. 1992); Mitchell v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463,467 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 252 (1990); Hanchey v.

Energas Co., 925 F.2d 96, 99 (5th Cir. 1990); Hebert v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 872 F.2d 1104,
1113 (1st Cir. 1989); Schuler v. Polaroid Corp., 848 F.2d 276, 279 (1st Cir. 1988); Bodnar v.
Synpol, Inc., 843 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); Sutton v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1981).

81 Henn, 819 F.2d at 829-30.
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The fault is not in the application, but rather in the theory of constructive discharge. By requiring plaintiffs to prove that the alternative conditions offered by the employer are themselves both
discriminatory and so unattractive as to compel resignation, the constructive discharge theory ignores how conditional retirement incentives interact with threats of future adverse personnel decisions.
Threats that would be insufficient to cause reasonable men to resign
absent a conditional offer of extra benefits could be sufficient to cause
resignation with such an offer. As noted in Part I, it may be very
reasonable for an employee who would prefer to continue to work,
even under the threat of discharge, to elect retirement with extra benefits that would not be available with any discharge."2 The conditional nature of the retirement incentive offered in Henn may have
induced the plaintiffs to resign even though they would have preferred
continued employment. Had the benefits available to them after discharge and retirement been identical, they may never have elected
retirement. The Geographic Society, like other employers since the
passage and elaboration of the ADEA, may have calculated that it
could effect the elimination of many of its older workers without individual evaluation of their productivity and without making itself vulnerable to ADEA claims. It could do so with muted threats of
imminent termination, insufficient to warrant a finding of constructive
discharge, if it supplemented those threats with a substantial retirement bonus that would be unavailable after closure of a limited temporal window.
Judge Easterbrook and others who have embraced the constructive
discharge theory might not be troubled by this analysis.8 3 In Henn,
for instance, Easterbrook expressed confidence that acceptance of an
early retirement incentive offer cannot be coerced or involuntary, and
thus illegal, as long as the alternative is not worse than a "status quo"
that complies with the ADEA.14 Viewing the conditional retirement
82 See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
83 See cases cited supra note 80; see also Abramson, supra note 10, at 346-50 (discussing
constructive discharge theory).
84 Henn, 819 F.2d at 826. Easterbrook presumably posits a "status quo" baseline of the
conditions that would exist absent the offer, rather than the conditions that existed prior to the
offer. Otherwise, his analysis would make vulnerable any exit incentive offer that also
announced an increased possibility of discharges because of an economic downturn. See also
Bodnar, 843 F.2d at 194 ("That risk inhered in elgible employees' failure to accept the SERIP
[Special Early Retirement Incentive Program] bonus offer, the risk that their jobs might be
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incentive as offering only an improvement in the offerees' position
enabled Easterbrook to equate it with any pension plan that encourages early retirement. He could then easily conclude that it was irrelevant that the Society wanted to reduce the age of its sales staff and

used the conditional retirement incentive to do so. 85
There are, however, several critical difficulties with this response.
Even if its assumptions were correct, it does not justify the constructive discharge doctrine that Henn and most other lower federal courts

have applied. An employer that threatens to illegally fire its older
employees if they refuse an early retirement offer has not necessarily
constructively discharged these employees. For instance, assume the
employer tells all of its older employees that after closure of the incentive window, they might be subject to more intense evaluation than

will younger employees. This is clearly a threat of illegal discrimination, but, absent consideration of the retirement incentive, a reasonable employee who wanted to continue to work would wait to see
actual evaluation results rather than resigning because she might be
illegally discharged after apossible evaluation. The conditional retirement incentive must be considered to make resignation reasonable in
this hypothetical, just as it must be considered to make resignation
86
reasonable in Henn or in the paradigm window plan scenario.
eliminated because of economic pressure on the company, is likewise insufficient to suggest age

discrimination.... It is thus fair here, as in Henn, to say that the SERIP afforded Appellants a
means to mitigate that risk which was not available to other employees.").
In Mitchell, 896 F.2d at 467-68, however, the Tenth Circuit seemed to adopt a reading of
Henn that posits a status quo baseline of the conditions that existed prior to the offer. In 1984,
Mobil announced it intended to reduce the lump sum option in its pension plan. Yet during
the following six-month period, all employees who had achieved eligibility under the old
standards could still receive unreduced payments. The court held that the acceptance of early
retirement during the six-month period could have constituted constructive discharge. Id.
The basis of this finding was that offerees who did not retire during the six-month period
would been in a worse position than they would have been in had Mobil not decided to restrict
the lump sum alternative in its retirement plan in the first place. Id.
However, contrary to general discrimination law, the court concluded that there was no
violation of the ADEA because Mitchell had not offered adequate proof that Mobil's purpose
in constructively discharging older workers was based on a desire to reduce its older
workforce. Id. at 471-73. For a discussion of how cases like Mitchell, which involve the
reduction of an ongoing, nonconditional retirement plan, should be treated, see infra text
accompanying note 200.
85Henn, 819 F.2d at 830.
86 It might be argued that Judge Easterbrook's response also does not support the
constructive discharge standard because that standard only requires proof that the offeree had
no alternative but to resign, not proof that she was threatened with illegal discrimination.
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Of course, the standards for constructive discharge in these cases
could be lowered to fit within Easterbrook's coercion analysis. Any
threat that the alternative to acceptance of an exit incentive offer will
involve illegal age discrimination could be assumed to justify resignation and thus to invalidate any acceptance. At least one court has
taken a step in this direction by finding that older employees who
accepted a conditional exit incentive offer from Montgomery Ward
made out a plausible case of constructive discharge by showing that
Montgomery Ward executives had used commonly understood code
phrases to signal which offerees would be vulnerable to the desire of
7
senior executives to reduce the age of management personnel.
But once it is acknowledged that any threat of illegal discrimination
should be sufficient to invalidate acceptance of incentives, it becomes
extremely difficult to distinguish valid from invalid conditional exit
incentives. First, Judge Easterbrook's apparent presumption that
most conditional exit incentives do not carry any threat of possible
illegal action may be erroneous. 8 Any exit incentive window that is
offered only to older employees carries some message, no matter how
muted, that the offeror would like to reduce the number of older
employees in its workforce. Such a message also always carries an
indirect threat that the employer might act further on the desire after
closure of the incentive window. In light of the expressed desire of
some Geographic Society executives to reduce the age of their
Courts taking the constructive discharge approach to conditional exit incentive offers,
however, have required plaintiffs to prove not only constructive discharge, but also
discriminatory age-based constructive discharge to ultimately prevail on their claims. See, e.g.,
Hanchey v. Energas Co., 925 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1990); Hebert v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 872
F.2d 1104 (1st Cir. 1989); Schuler v. Polaroid Corp., 848 F.2d 276 (Ist Cir. 1988); Sutton v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1981). Henn's language has nonetheless led to
some confusion on this point, as some courts following Henn have merged the constructive
discharge issue with the age discrimination issue. See Kilgore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.
Supp. 1535 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that there was no prima facie case of constructive
discharge because "a reasonable jury could not conclude.., that Sears would have fired him
because of his age").
87 Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 650 F. Supp. 1480, 1484-85 (N.D. Ill. 1987),
vacated in part on other grounds, 704 F. Supp. 162 (N.D. InI. 1989); see also Sutton, 646 F.2d
at 409 n.5 (suggesting that "possible" demotion or discharge is enough for constructive
discharge); cf. Walker v. Mountain State Tel. & Tel. Co., 686 F. Supp. 269, 274 (D. Colo.
1988) (holding that demotion and relocation constitutes constructive discharge).
88 The assumption may only be reasonable for tenured faculty and perhaps some employees
covered by collective bargaining agreements with security from unjust discharge.
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workforce, the offer in Henn to only older salespersons certainly must
have carried this message.8 9

Yet proof that future discrimination has actually been threatened
may be very difficult, much more difficult than proof that discrimination actually occurred in the past. 90

Moreover, if we set aside the

traditional constructive discharge standard, it is difficult to resist concluding that whether a threat is sufficiently clear and direct to warrant
a justifiable resignation should turn in part on the attractiveness of the
incentives that would be foregone by a realization of the threat-in
other words, on what Easterbrook tells us should be irrelevant to the
question of validity. 9 1

There is another important flaw in the position that conditional exit
incentives are legal under the ADEA if the promised alternative to
their acceptance would be legal. As explained above, there may be a
number of reasons to regulate voluntary trades of legal rights. One of
these reasons is the discouragement of activity that society collectively
has decided to condemn. If the ADEA condemns the age-based elim-

ination from the workforce of those who wish to continue to work, we
should be troubled by employers' achievement of such results through
conditional exit incentives, just as we are troubled by the encourage89Henn, 819 F.2d at 826.
90 Henn illustrates why threats of future age discrimination, when used with conditional

exit incentives, can be subtle and thus much more difficult to prove than actual discriminatory
discharges. Twelve of the fifteen older salespersons offered the Geographic Society's
retirement incentive accepted it. The Society was able to achieve its goal of significantly
reducing the age of its sales force without leaving the clear tracks of age discrimination that
would have been created by the discharge of 12 of 15 older employees. See id. at 829-30; see
also Bodnar v. Synpol, Inc., 843 F.2d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The appellants' vague and
subjective impressions of threats conveyed by their supervisors when discussing the SERIP
[Special Early Retirement Incentive Program] plan are too insubstantial a reed, in the absence
of objective factors or actions suggesting age discrimination, on which to found a jury issue.").
91Indeed, the primary case on which the Montgomery Ward decision relied in its
constructive discharge analysis, Downey v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 649 F.2d 302 (5th Cir.
1981), seems to have taken into account the plaintiff's potential loss of retirement benefits in
deciding that he could have been constructively discharged by a threat of possible future
discharge, even though the district court had found that his working conditions were not so
intolerable as to give him no choice but to resign:
Essentially, the test is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would
have felt compelled to resign. Downey asserts that his superior specifically advised him
that he might be discharged, with a consequent loss of benefits. We regard that
testimony as sufficient to create a contested issue of material fact regarding constructive
discharge.
Id. at 304.
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ment of future age discrimination by the voluntary prospective waivers of rights to be free of discrimination.
Unfortunately, the Henn approach is blind to this functional equivalence of the operation of an exit incentive plan with the securing of
prospective waivers. In fact, the Henn plaintiffs traded the future
protection of the ADEA for extra retirement benefits. The Geographic Society could have offered the same trade of ADEA rights for
benefits by promising to give the extra retirement benefits to any older
salesperson who was willing to waive her right to sue for any future
discriminatory dismissal. If not regulated, this would have freed the
Society to accomplish the same age-based terminations it in fact
accomplished through the conditional exit incentives. Yet even when
voluntary, prospective waivers are proscribed.
B. The FairProcessApproach
The only other lower court approach to the legality of conditional
exit incentives is also flawed by a similarly excessive, though somewhat different, focus on the "voluntariness" of employees' acceptances. In Paolillov. DresserIndustries,Inc. (Paolilloi/),92 the Second
Circuit, in an opinion by Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg, held that
plaintiffs should have an opportunity to prove at trial that their
acceptance of a conditional exit incentive offer was not voluntary
because they were given inadequate time fully to consider the offer.
The Paolillo plaintiffs' employer, Whitney Chain, "in the midst of a
significant business decline," offered all its employees of sixty years
and older severance pay and certain other benefits if they agreed to
retire early within six days after the original announcement of the
offer.93 The actual amount of extra benefits varied with each
employee, presumably because of different ages, years of service, and
salary. The Paolillo court assumed that two of the three plaintiffs had
three days to decide on acceptance after their individual benefits were
identified, and that the third may only have had one day.94 One
employee only obtained severance pay of $608.88 per month for two
years, one only $388.75 per month for two years, and the third only a
lump sum of $13,390. 95 There is no suggestion in the opinion, how92
93
94
95

821 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1987), language modified, 884 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id.
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ever, that Whitney Chain made any express threats of adverse consequences for employees who declined the offer.

The Second Circuit held that any acceptance of early retirement
must be "voluntary" to be effective and that "it is relevant to the
determination of voluntariness whether the employees received suffi-

cient time to make a decision. "96 The court also suggested that the
"reason for the compressed time period" and the "apparent complexity of the options open to them" would, inter alia, be relevant to
97
whether they were given sufficient time.
The Paolillo court's recognition that the process by which employees decide whether to accept early retirement may be relevant to
whether their acceptance should be enforced provides a useful supple-

ment to the Henn approach to voluntariness. 98 Even retroactive
waivers of mature discrimination claims must be knowing and voluntary, and employees may need time to digest information about
options. Courts considering releases of ADEA rights have understood this, and the OWBPA confirms it expressly by providing that

retroactive waivers cannot be knowing and voluntary if they are made
without a minimum time period of at least twenty-one days for con-

sideration. 99 Also, the amount of time given for consideration of an
offer may itself be relevant to the offerees' assessment of the threat of
discharge after closure of the window.
Id. at 84.
Id. Chief Judge Feinberg took his Second Circuit panel in Paolillo a step further in a
decision that was withdrawn after rehearing. Paoliflo v. Dresser Indus. (Paolillo1), 813 F.2d
583 (2d Cir. 1987). In this first decision, Judge Feinberg expressly placed the burden of
proving voluntariness on the defendant employer: "the use of an early retirement plan to
remove older workers from the work force because of their age is an exception to the ADEA's
general prohibition against age discrimination, and accordingly, the party wishing to fit within
the exception bears the burden of proving its applicability." Id. at 341.
98 Henn itself actually expressed ambivalence about the relevance of the time period
afforded offerees. On the one hand, it criticized the Paolillo II court by claiming that "the
need to make a decision in a short time, under pressure, is an unusual definition of
'involuntary."' Henn, 819 F.2d at 828. On the other hand, it also allows that the
"voluntariness" question could turn on such things as the adequacy of information about the
choice and whether the employee had an opportunity to digest complex information. Id. at
828-29.
99 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)(i). Indeed, if the "waiver is requested in connection with an
exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group or class of
employees, the individual [must be] given a period of at least 45 days within which to consider
the agreement." Id. § 626(f)(1)(F)(ii). Furthermore, any waiver agreement must provide "a
period of at least 7 days following the execution of such agreement" during which the
agreement can be revoked. Id. § 626(f)(1)(G); see infra text accompanying notes 172-75.
96
97

1993]

Age-Based Exit Incentives

1307

Yet Paolilo's approach to conditional exit incentive offers seems
more appropriate to waivers of mature ADEA claims than to the
waiver of future ADEA protection. The opinion reflects no recognition that even fully informed and considered acceptances of conditional exit incentives enable employers to circumvent ADEA
restrictions and displace older workers who may wish to continue to
work. It thus fails to resolve the tension between conditional incentives and the broad goals of the ADEA.
The Paolillo approach has usually been considered to require more
of conditional exit incentive programs than the constructive discharge
approach of Henn. 100 However, if Paolillo is read to provide an alternative rather than a supplement to constructive discharge analysis, it
might allow even the clearly coerced acceptances that Henn would
invalidate. A conditional early retirement offeree who is confronted
with the alternative of probable discharge will rationally choose
retirement regardless of the amount of time and information he has
been given to make his decision. Yet that offeree could claim that his
choice was coerced by a constructive discharge.
At least one relatively early decision of the Sixth Circuit, Ackerman
v. Diamond Shamrock Corp.,101 employs Paolillo fair process standards of voluntariness to the exclusion of constructive discharge analysis. Edward Ackerman accepted a conditional early retirement offer
after being told that he would be terminated after his job responsibilities were divided between two younger workers. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed a summary judgment that his retirement was voluntary
because the benefits of the agreement were generous, he had four
weeks to consider it, and he stated that he was going to have an attorney examine it.102 The Paolillo decision is not inconsistent with Ack100 See, e.g., Bodnar v. Synpol, Inc., 843 F.2d 190, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1988); see also infra note
106 (explaining the Fifth Circuit's approach in Bodnar).
101670 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1982).
102Id. at 69-70. Ackerman was limited by a subsequent Sixth Circuit per curiam decision,
Ruane v. G.F. Business Equip., No. 86-3955, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 11709 (6th Cir. Sept. 1,
1987), that suggests this circuit might itself apply at least a traditional constructive discharge

standard in tandem with a voluntary process standard in future cases. John J. Ruane was
given the option of electing retirement from his supervisory job or returning to a unionrepresented bargaining unit position. Id. at * 1. Ruane elected retirement after understanding
that returning to the bargaining unit would cost him over $10,000 in immediate payments and
a monthly pension of $475. Id. The Ruane court refused to grant summary judgment for the
employer against Ruane's claim of discriminatory discharge. Id. at *3. It distinguished
Ackerman by asserting not only that Ackerman had been given adequate time to make his
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erman.11 3 Judge Feinberg indicated that any pressure that Paolillo
felt to accept the offer because of the "uncertain future" of his
employer would not make his acceptance involuntary." 4
In any event, whether it stands alone or as a supplement to the
constructive discharge approach, Paolillo'sfair process approach does
not promise the kind of regulation of conditional age-based exit incentive offers that would protect achievement of the antidiscrimination
goals of the ADEA.105 In order to do so, Congress will have to recognize the actual impact of these incentives and require further
regulation. 06
decision, but also that Ackerman "was not otherwise distinctly informed that he had no right
to remain in his present employment." Id. The Sixth Circuit concluded that Ruane, by
contrast, did not have "the potential option to retain his former employment." Id. This
analysis suggests that at least any offeree who is told that he will be terminated if he does not
accept retirement, can challenge his resignation under the ADEA if he can prove that it is agebased.
103 By contrast, it does seem clear that any court taking a constructive discharge approach
would have to reject Ackerman. As stated by a First Circuit panel following Henn: "[W]e
explicitly reject the teaching of Ackerman and hold that, absent the option to choose to keep
working under lawful conditions, an employer's offer of a choice between early retirement with
benefits or discharge without benefits is nothing other than a discharge." Hebert v. Mohawk
Rubber Co., 872 F.2d 1104, 1113 (lst Cir. 1989).
104 Paolilo II, 821 F.2d at 84. On the other hand, the Paolillo plaintiffs presented no
evidence that they were threatened with age-based discharges. Furthermore, in its
reconsideration of the case after trial, the Second Circuit criticized the trial judge for confusing
its fair process approach to voluntariness with the issue of constructive discharge. The court's
language suggests that in another case it would use both theories: "The two situations are
different, even though the departure of the employee in each is not truly voluntary." Paolillo
v. Dresser Indus. (PaolilloI1), 865 F.2d 37, 40 (2nd Cir.), language modified, 884 F.2d 707
(2nd Cir. 1989).
At least one circuit decision, without citing Paolillo, has used a fair process approach to
supplement its purported reliance on Henn to reject a worker's claim that she was coerced into
accepting an early retirement offer. See Gray v. York Newspapers, 957 F.2d 1070, 1085 (3rd
Cir. 1992).
105 The Second Circuit's subsequent review of the trial in Paolillo reveals another problem
with its application of a fair process approach. The appellate court agreed that plaintiffs still
carry an additional burden of proving that a desire to eliminate older workers motivated the
adoption of the age-based coercive termination plan. It apparently is not sufficient for
plaintiffs simply to show that the plan was offered to employees selected on the basis of age and
that the plan operated to force resignations. Paolilo 11I, 865 F.2d at 40. This additional
motivation analysis seems inconsistent with discrimination law's general condemnation of
disparate treatment regardless of motivation. See supra notes 37-39.
106 A Fifth Circuit decision, written after Henn and Paolillo, that indicates a willingness to
use the two approaches together to determine whether an acceptance of an exit incentive is
"voluntary," nevertheless affirmed a summary judgment for the employer without appreciating
the real impact of the conditional incentive. See Bodnar v. Synpol, Inc., 843 F.2d 190, 193-94
(5th Cir. 1988).
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THE OWBPA AND EXIT INCENTIVE PROGRAMS

The OWBPA does not, however, provide for such further regulation. The OWBPA can and should be read to require use of a modified Paolillo fair process approach" 7 in tandem with a liberally
interpreted constructive discharge approach to conditional age-based
exit incentive windows. Unfortunately, the OWBPA cannot be read
to require the kind of regulation needed to correct the tension
between early retirement incentives and antidiscrimination goals.
The two substantive titles of the OWBPA have independent origins
and purposes. The final language and legislative history of each, however, reflects both an awareness of the potential for conditional agebased exit incentive programs being challenged by offerees, and also
an intent that the pre-Act, or at least pre-Betts, judicial treatment of
such challenges not be significantly altered.
A.
1.

Title I

The Rejection of Betts

Section 101's statement of the purpose of Title I of the OWBPA
supports reading the Act to confirm, rather than modify, judicial
treatment of offeree challenges to conditional age-based exit incentive
windows. Section 101 expresses a congressional finding that the
Court's decision in Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v.
Betts'1 required amending the ADEA "to restore the original congressional intent in passing and amending" the ADEA. 109 Betts interpreted language in section 4(0(2) of the ADEA that provided "it shall
not be unlawful... to observe the terms of a... bona fide employee
benefit plan ... which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes" of
the ADEA.1 10 Betts held that this language meant that the ADEA
was not intended to prohibit age discrimination in employee benefit
plans unless that discrimination operates as a "subterfuge" for age
discrimination outside the benefit plans-discrimination in "hiring
107

See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.

108492 U.S. 158 (1989).
109 OWBPA, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 101, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as amended at 29

U.S.C. § 621 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
110 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2); see Betts, 492 U.S. at 161.
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and firing, wages and salaries, and other non-fringe-benefit terms and
11
conditions of employment."'
This holding did not necessarily require any modification of the

Henn or Paolillo approaches to challenges to conditional age-based
exit incentive windows. Both the constructive discharge and voluntary process approaches are directed at determining whether exit
incentives are only a way of offering extra benefits to older employees,
or are also a method of forcing such employees to quit work "involuntarily." If the acceptance of an incentive is deemed involuntary under
either approach, and if the reason for the coercion is the elimination
of older employees because of their age,' 1 2 then the plan can be said to

be used as a subterfuge for age discrimination in employment,
a form
3
of discrimination proscribed even under the Betts regime.1
2. The Special Treatment of Early Retirement Incentives
More importantly, Title I's special treatment of "early retirement
incentives" is also fully consistent with Henn and Paolillo. This special treatment is multifaceted. First, Title I provides a general defense
to claims that an early retirement incentive plan is discriminatory
beyond the general defense made available for other benefit plans.
The general defense granted under the OWBPA for most benefit plans
M1
492 U.S. at 177.
112 Betts did not require more proof of discriminatory motive than did Henn and Paolillo.
Under the Henn approach, a finding that conditional exit incentive offerees have been
constructively discharged by a threat of discrimination should be sufficient to also conclude
that the offer was motivated by a desire to eliminate older employees. Proving subterfuge after
proof of the constructive discharge of age-defined offerees might be burdensome under a
modified Henn approach, like that taken in Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., under which a
constructive discharge can be based on a threat of any deterioration of before-offer working
conditions, regardless of cause. See Mitchell, 896 F.2d at 467; see also supra note 84
(explaining the facts and analyzing the approach in Mitchell).
Further, under the Paolillo approach, a finding that acceptances of exit incentives were
coerced would not necessarily establish that the reason for the coercion was to terminate older
workers. For instance, giving employees a short time to consider their options might be
explained by financial pressures on the employer. However, without relying on Betts, both the
Mitchell court and the Paolillo III court, in an additional post-trial decision, held that
plaintiffs do have to prove independently that their coercion was motivated by a desire to
terminate older workers. Mitchell, 896 F.2d at 471-73; Paolllo v. Dresser Indus. (Paolilo111),
865 F.2d 37 (2nd Cir), language modified, 884 F. 2d 707 (2nd Cir. 1989); see also supra note
105 (explaining Paolillo I1).
113 See AARP v. Farmers Group, Inc., 943 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that reducing
pension and profit-sharing plan benefits for employees over age 65 in order to encourage
retirement was a subterfuge for age discrimination under Betts).
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tracks the pre-Betts standard for judging age-based employee benefit
plans set forth in an EEOC regulation that purported to interpret section 4(f)(2). The OWBPA, like the regulation, validates benefit plans
for which "the actual amount of payment made or cost incurred on
behalf of an older worker is no less than that made or incurred on
behalf of a younger worker."'1 14 This permits younger workers to
receive greater amounts of benefits like life and health insurance that
become more expensive with the age of the recipient, as long as the
employer does not actually spend more on the younger worker. The
general defense for early retirement incentive plans, by contrast, insulates plans that are "voluntary" and "consistent with the relevant pur15
pose or purposes of this chapter."'
The OWBPA also gives special attention to early retirement incentives by specifically providing that such incentives cannot be illegal
"solely" because of any of three characteristics. First, any pension
plan may require the attainment of a minimum age as a condition of
eligibility for receiving early or normal retirement benefits.' 1 6 Second,
a defined benefit plan may provide "payments that constitute the subsidized portion of an early retirement benefit." ' 1 7 Third, to those who
retire before becoming eligible to receive social security benefits, a
defined benefit plan may provide bridge payments that do not exceed
the social security benefits that these early retirees will later receive. "18
Each of these three special provisions has a clear purpose. First,
any pension plan that provides retirement benefits only to employees
who have attained some minimum age encourages only older workers
to exit from employment and thus might be viewed to be in tension
with the ADEA's goal "to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age.""' 9 Hence, Congress found it
necessary to clarify in the OWBPA that it did not intend, by overruling Betts, to indicate that a pension plan violates the Act solely
114 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i). This provision makes specific reference to the EEOC
interpretative regulation published at 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10 (1992), as in effect on June 22, 1989.
This regulation was originally promulgated by the Department of Labor, the agency that was
initially charged with the implementation of the ADEA. The regulation was expressly rejected
by the Betts court. See Betts, 492 U.S. at 175.
11529 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(ii).
116Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.

§
§
§
§

623(1)(1)(A).
6230)(1)(B)(i).
623(1)(1)(B)(ii).
621(b); see supra text accompanying note 11.
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because it only provides benefits to those who have reached some minimum age. 120
Second, defined benefit pension plans, both in the public and private sectors, frequently promise younger retirees benefits that would
be calculated by an actuary to have greater present value than the
benefits promised older retirees. For instance, such plans often allow
workers to retire before some "normal" retirement age and receive a
level of monthly benefits that, although lower than that received by
workers who retire at an older age, is still sufficiently high to be of
greater actuarial worth.
Third, defined benefit pension plans also often provide for bridge
payments to workers who retire before reaching the age required for
receipt of social security benefits, continuing those payments until
attainment of that age. 121 Each of these normal practices provides
greater benefits to younger workers and thus would be vulnerable to
challenge under the OWBPA if the only defense available was that
which the OWBPA allows for most age-based benefit plans-actuarial
cost justification. Congress thus found it necessary to include "safe
harbor" exceptions122in the OWBPA to clarify the legality of these
common practices.
The Alternative General Defense Provision
The congressional purpose in providing a different general defense
for early retirement incentives is somewhat more difficult to identify.
The statute does not exempt all retirement incentives, just those that
are "voluntary" and "consistent with the relevant purpose or purposes" of the ADEA. 123 One must review the legislative history of
Title I more closely to understand the intended meaning of these
ambiguous words.
That history indicates that Congress was concerned with the
impact of Betts, not on Henn or Paolillo-type involuntary discharge
disputes, but rather on challenges to early retirement incentives that

3.

120In fact, no court has held that a minimum age floor in a retirement plan violates the

ADEA simply because it excludes workers over the ADEA minimum protected age of 40.
See, e.g., Cronin v. ITT Corp., 737 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 916 F.2d 709 (2d Cir.
1990).
121 See S. Rep. No. 263, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.

1509, 1526-27.
122Id.; see 136 Cong. Rec. S13,603 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Pryor).
12329 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(ii).
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are offered to younger workers but not to older workers. The holding
in Betts required a change in judicial treatment of these latter challenges because they are founded on the denial of a benefit on the basis
of old age, rather than the encouragement of retirement on the basis
of age. A prominent example, much discussed in OWBPA's legislative history, 124 can be drawn from Cipriano v. Board of Education of
North Tonawanda (Cipriano I1).125 North Tonawanda had offered,
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, a choice of two early
retirement benefit packages for teachers who retired at an age between
fifty-five and sixty during the three-year term of the agreement. Sarah
Cipriano and another teacher, who had both passed their sixty-first
birthday prior to the effective date of the agreement, sued under the
ADEA to collect the retirement benefits for which they would have
12 6
been eligible had they been a bit younger.
The Supreme Court's Betts decision would have mandated that
such a suit be summarily dismissed. 12 7 Whereas Betts' interpretation
of the section 4(f)(2) subterfuge defense would have required the older
plaintiffs to show that the employer's purpose in not making the offer
to them was to treat them less favorably with respect to something
other than retirement benefits,121 they had only complained about the
failure to offer equal retirement benefits. Before Betts, however, the
lower courts disagreed about the degree to which section 4(f(2) insulated early retirement decisions from such challenges.
In CiprianoI, the Second Circuit held that whether the grant of an
early retirement option to younger workers that was denied older
workers would violate the ADEA depended on the employer's reason
for the denial. The court held that section 4(f)(2) afforded the defend124S. Rep. No. 263, supra note 121, at 28; H.R. Rep. No. 664, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 44
(1990); see also Older Workers Benefit Protection Act: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Special Comm. on Aging
on S.1511, 101st. Cong., 1st Sess. 175, 303 (1990) [hereinafter Joint Hearing] (providing
prepared statement of AARP advocate).
125700 F. Supp. 1199 (W.D.N.Y. 1988), on remand from CiprianoI, 785 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.
1986), vacated in part, 772 F. Supp. 1346 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (vacating in light of Betts).
126CiprianoII, 700 F. Supp. at 1201-02.
127See Robinson v. County of Fresno, 882 F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir. 1989); Lynch v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 758 F. Supp. 976, 1019 (D.N.J. 1991); Gabarczyk v. Board of Educ., 738 F.
Supp. 118, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
128 Betts, 492 U.S. at 181. Betts also held, contrary to some previous lower court decisions,
that the burden of proof on the subterfuge question remains with the plaintiff employee. Id.
(rejecting, e.g., CiprianoI, 785 F.2d at 57).
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ant employer the opportunity to demonstrate that the plan was not a
"subterfuge" for evading the ADEA by proving that it had a "legitimate business reason for structuring the plan as it did." 12 9 On
remand, the trial court found that the North Tonawanda School
Board had met this burden by demonstrating that on average the
retirement of a highly paid senior teacher between the ages of fifty-five
and sixty would save the Board more total labor costs than the retirement of an even older teacher who was likely to retire relatively soon
130
without any extra incentive.
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit, in Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago,13 1 rejected an employer's defense of an early retirement plan's
reduction in benefits after the age of sixty-four by interpreting section
4(f)(2) in accordance with the cost-incurred justification contained in
the EEOC regulation that was expressly rejected in Betts and adopted
for most benefit plans by the OWBPA. 132 As the Seventh Circuit
129Cipriano I, 785 F.2d at 58; see also Patterson v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 709, 742
F.2d 465, 467 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that benefit plan "must not be a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of the statute to eliminate discrimination based on age").
130 Cipriano II, 700 F. Supp. at 1208. The circuit court decision had suggested that this
would be a legitimate reason for structuring the plan to provide retirement incentives only for
55 to 60 year olds. See CiprianoI, 785 F.2d at 55.
The district court also held that while facially valid, the North Tonawanda early retirement
plan did illegally discriminate against the two plaintiffs because it had been adopted after they
were already older than the maximum age of eligibility. See CiprianoII, 700 F. Supp. at 1212.
The court stated that since the plaintiffs were never given any incentive to retire, the only basis
for denying them an opportunity to gain the special benefits was an assumption that they
"would be retiring anyway," and this "is not the type of legitimate business reason
contemplated by the Second Circuit." Id. at 1211. Although it is difficult to reconcile this
holding with the court's acceptance of the general validity of the retirement plan, it may be
that the district court was making the same distinction between acceptable and unacceptable
business reasons attributed to the OWBPA below. See infra text accompanying notes 141-42.
131837 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1044 (1988).
132Id. at 319-20. In the Karlen decision, Judge Richard A. Posner expressed a better
appreciation than has any other judge of the effects and purposes of conditional age-based exit
incentives. Posner rejected the employer's plea that it must substantially reduce the early
retirement incentive after age 64 to make the incentive a strong inducement for resignation:
This strikes us as a damaging admission rather than a powerful defense. To withhold
benefits from older persons in order to induce them to retire seems precisely the form of
discrimination at which the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is aimed. Rather
than offering a carrot to all workers 55 years and older, as in the Henn case, the City
Colleges are offering the whole carrot to workers 55 to 64 and taking back half for
workers 65 to 69. The reason is that the Colleges want to induce workers to retire by
65.
Id. at 320.
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noted, 133 it is difficult to understand why the retirement benefits of
workers who leave work after some age such as sixty or sixty-four
should cost an employer more than the retirement benefits of workers
who leave at a somewhat younger age. The Cipriano court may have
been correct to assume that on average the retirement of highly paid
senior workers at a younger age will save an employer more money
than will the retirement of such workers somewhat later, 134 but this
does not mean that without the age ceiling on the special retirement
incentives, the cost of the older workers' retirement packages would
be greater than those given to younger workers.
In Betts, the Supreme Court implicitly rejected the Cipriano "legitimate business reason" approach, as well as Karlen's strict application
of the EEOC regulation. 135 Betts held that benefit plans are not rendered illegal by offering more to younger workers, regardless of the
employer's reasons, unless those reasons are to circumvent the
ADEA's prohibition of discrimination in nonbenefit plan
36
conditions.
The legislative history of Title I of the OWBPA indicates that Congress's rejection of Betts extends to this treatment of challenges to
early retirement incentive plans. The legislation that became the
OWBPA was fashioned by a compromise in the Senate between the
Democratic leadership and key Republican Senators who apparently
represented the White House as well. This compromise produced a
"final substitute" to Senate Bill 1511 that passed both Houses by over1 37
whelming margins.

The announcement of the Senate compromise was accompanied by
a Statement of Managers that attempts to explain the intended meaning of some of the Act's more ambiguous provisions, including the
general defense for early retirement plans. 38 That Statement con133 Id.

134 CiprianoII, 700 F. Supp. at 1208.

135 See Robinson v. County of Fresno, 882 F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying Betts to
reject a challenge to an early retirement plan and finding that Betts' "reasoning implicitly
overrules the decisions of... Karlen ... and Cipriano").
136Betts, 492 U.S. at 177.

137 The vote in the Senate on September 24, 1990, was 94 to one. 136 Cong. Rec. S13,611
(daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990). The vote in the House of Representatives on October 3, 1990, was
406 to 17. 136 Cong. Rec. H8,738 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990). President Bush signed the bill on
October 16, 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990).
138Statement of Managers, 136 Cong. Rec. S13,596-97 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990).
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firms declarations in earlier Committee Reports from both bodies that
Congress did not accept the complete insulation of early retirement
incentives from Cipriano-typechallenges:
Early retirement incentive plans that withhold benefits to older workers above a specific age while continuing to make them available to
younger workers may conflict with the purpose of prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination in employment. The purpose of prohibiting
arbitrary age discrimination in employment also is undermined by
denying or reducing benefits to older workers based on age-related
stereotypes. For example, it would be unlawful under this substitute
to exclude older workers from an early retirement incentive plan
based on stereotypical
assumptions that "older workers would be
13 9
retiring anyway.s

On the other hand, Congress' decision not to subject all "voluntary" early retirement plans to the equal cost-incurred standard that it
adopted for the defense of other age-based benefit plans indicates that
Congress wanted the courts at least to consider whether an
employer's reasons for adopting an age-based retirement plan were
consistent with the antidiscrimination purpose of the ADEA. The
Statement of Managers in the Senate asserts:
An early retirement incentive plan need not be shown to be consistent
with every purpose of the ADEA in order to be found lawful. That
would be an impossible burden for an employer to meet. As a general
matter, the purpose implicated in considering an early retirement
incentive plan or any particular feature of such a plan is the purpose
of prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination in employment. 1"
These two quotations from the Statement of Managers suggest that
the ambiguous general defense for early retirement incentives in the
OWBPA was intended to allow the courts to fashion a different kind
of compromise treatment of Cipriano-type challenges. In particular,
courts might hold that while employers cannot justify a maximum age
cutoff in an early retirement incentive by claiming that incentives are
not needed for older workers who are likely to retire soon in any
event, employers can justify a cutoff by demonstrating that it provides
an incentive for workers in a particular age bracket to retire before
they reach the cutoff date and lose the option of choosing extra bene139 Id. at S13,596.
140 Id.; see also S.

Rep. No. 263, supra note 121, at 28 (suggesting similar purpose).
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fits. 41 The latter justification is not based on any generalization about
older workers of a particular age, nor does it reflect a desire to deny
older workers benefits. It is only in tension with the purposes of the
ADEA for the same reason that conditional age-based exit incentives
conflict with the purposes of the Act: it expresses a desire to induce
the exit of workers who, but for a concern about loss of benefits,
would prefer to continue to work. 142
This interpretation of Congress's purpose in providing an ambigu-

ous general defense for early retirement incentive plans is confirmed
by looking more closely at the consideration of Henn-type constructive discharge challenges to these plans in the legislative history of
Title I of the OWBPA. This history does not indicate that Congress
was concerned about the impact of Betts on Henn-type, rather than
Cipriano-typechallenges. Instead, it strongly suggests that Congress
wanted the OWBPA to preserve both the Henn and Paolilo

approaches.
141 This is the argument rejected by Judge Posner in Karlen. See 837 F.2d at 320; see also
supra note 132 (discussing Judge Posner's reasoning in Karlen). The Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee Report on S. 1511, the predecessor of the OWBPA, quotes
Judge Posner's rejection of this justification with approval. See S. Rep. No. 263, supra note
121, at 27. It also states that
[e]arly retirement incentive plans that deny or reduce benefits to older workers while
continuing to make them available to younger workers may encourage premature
departure from employment by older workers. This not only conflicts with the purpose
of eliminating age discrimination in employee benefits; it also frustrates (rather than
promotes) the employment of older persons.
Id. See generally Rebecca S. Stith & William A. Kohlburn, Early Retirement Plans After the
Passage of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, I1 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 263, 263
n.4, 276 n.66 (1992) (stressing this language).
However, the amendment to S. 1511 on the floor of the Senate changed the requirement that
voluntary early retirement incentive plans further the "purposes" of the ADEA to the requirement that such a plan be "consistent with the relevant purpose or purposes" of ADEA. Compare S. Rep. No. 263, supra note 121, at 2 (stating that bona fide voluntary early retirement
plans that further the purposes of the Act are permissible) with 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f)(2)(B)(ii)
(providing that voluntary plans are those consistent with the relevant purpose of the Act).
Also, the Statement of Managers asserts that the relevant purpose of the Act for early retirment plans will be "prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination in employment." Statement of
Managers, supra note 138, at S13,596.
142 An employer's desire to save significant labor costs by inducing senior workers to resign
so it can hire lower paid, and probably younger, new workers may also be consistent with the
purpose of Title I as expressed in section 101: "to prohibit discrimination against older
workers in all employee benefits except when age-based reductions in employee benefit plans
are justified by significant cost considerations." Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978, 978
(1990).

1318

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 79:1271

First, the history suggests that by conditioning the general defense
of early retirement incentives on their being "voluntary," Congress
meant to approve the conjunctive use of Henn andPaolillo.The Statement of Managers provides that:
In order to determine whether a voluntary decision has been made,
among the factors that may be relevant are (1) whether the employee
had sufficient time to consider his or her options; (2) whether accurate
and complete information has been provided regarding the benefits
available under the early retirement incentive plan; and (3) whether
there have been threats, intimidation and/or coercion. 143
Furthermore, the Committee Report on Senate Bill 1511, which after
further amendments eventually became the OWBPA, cites Paolillo in
support of Henn's constructive discharge standard: "The critical
question involving allegations of involuntary retirement is whether,
under the circumstances, a reasonable person would
have concluded
144
that there was no choice but to accept the offer."'
These statements do not necessarily establish that Congress wanted
the Paolillo fair process standard to be applied independently of the
Henn constructive discharge standard. They do, however, make clear
that Congress would not approve of using Paolillo as a substitute for,
rather than as a supplement to, Henn. The OWBPA therefore should
be read to confirm the lower courts' rejection of the early Sixth Circuit decision in Ackerman, in so far as that case held that an employer
can induce early retirement by offering special benefits as an alternative to discharge without such benefits. 45 As further stated by the
Senate managers: "no employee benefit plan... may require or per' 46
mit the involuntary retirement of any individual."'
4. Limits to Title I Regulation of Early Retirement Incentives
On the other hand, the legislative history of Title I cannot be read
to conclude that no conditional age-based exit incentive window offers
are protected by the general OWBPA defense for early retirement
143 Statement of Managers, supra note 138, at S13,596.
144 S. Rep. No. 263, supra note 121, at 27.

145 See Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp. 670 F.2d 66, 69-70 (6th Cir. 1982); see also
Ruane v. G.F. Business Equip., No. 86-3955, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 11709 (6th Cir. Sept. 1,
1987) (limiting Ackerman in Sixth Circuit); Hebert v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 872 F.2d 1104,
1112-13 (1st Cir. 1989) (criticizing and rejecting Ackerman).
146 Statement of Managers, supra note 138, at S13,596.

1993]

Age-Based Exit Incentives

1319

incentives, either because they are all inherently coercive or because
they are inconsistent with the antidiscrimination purposes of the
ADEA. The Statement of Managers specifically states that "a plan
that gives employees who have attained age 55 and who retire during
a specified window period credit for 5 additional years of service and/
or age would be lawful." 1 47 The Statement also lists other incentives,
such as lump-sum payments and "flat dollar" or percentage increases
in pensions, that "would remain lawful" if extended "to all employees
above a certain age," rather than being capped off at a maximum age
as in Cipriano.148 The Senate Labor Committee Report agreed that
"it may be permissible for an employer to establish a time-related
'window' program under which employees are offered a special incentive for a limited period of time in order to make retirement a more
149
attractive option."
By contrast, the history of the initiative to overrule Betts does not
reflect a congressional recognition that any conditional age-based exit
incentive window, by threatening the loss of a valuable special benefit,
can induce retirement from employees who would prefer to work.150
Nor does it evince an understanding that any conditional age-based
offer may threaten an offeree with possible post-offer discrimination
simply by communicating to him the offeror's desire to reduce the age
of its workforce.
This legislative history suggests that the courts are free to develop
the Henn and Paolillo approaches so that they fully comport with the
theories of voluntariness on which they are based.'-" For instance,
the language and legislative history of the OWBPA would support, if
not require, finding even cost-efficient age-based incentives illegal
147 Id.
148 Id.

149 S. Rep. No. 263, supra note 121, at 28.
150 The Statement of Managers instead specifically directs courts not to consider the
"attractiveness of an early retirement incentive" when evaluating its legality. See Statement of
Managers, supra note 138, at S13,596.
151The Statement of Managers asserts that employee-plaintiffs retain "the burden of proof
regarding the issue of involuntariness." Id. This assertion, however, seems inconsistent with
the language of the OWBPA, which assigns "the burden of proving that [their] actions are
lawful" to defendants "acting under" the general defense for early retirement incentives. See
29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2). Moreover, the Senate Report on S. 1511, states that "[c]onsistent with
the burdens of proof under section 4(f)(2)(B), the employer bears the burden to demonstrate
that the employee's participation in the plan is voluntary." S. Rep. No. 263, supra note 121, at
27.
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once they are deemed involuntary under the Henn and Paolillo standards. Age-based plans that are not "voluntary" cannot fit under the
general OWBPA defense for early retirement incentives, and therefore should be prohibited regardless of motivation, like any other
form of facial discrimination, despite suggestions to the contrary by
the Second Circuit in its last Paolillo decision'1 2 and by the Tenth
Circuit in an unusual application of Henn. 53 It would also be appropriate for future courts to follow the lead of the Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co. decision in finding acceptances involuntary when
they are induced by signals that particular offerees, in part selected by
age, will be particularly vulnerable to discharge after closure of the
incentive offer window.1 54 Such acceptances can be regarded as
'
infected by "threats, intimidation, and/or coercion,"155
whether or
not the threats would have been sufficient to cause a reasonable
employee to resign in the absence of the extra incentive offered by the
156
employer.
The discretion of the lower courts to expand Henn, however, is certainly limited. Congress did not contemplate the courts striking down
age-based offers as inconsistent with the ADEA simply because they
provide special encouragement to the retirement of older workers.15 7
Nor did it view such offers as illegally coercive simply because the
offerees know that the alternative to acceptance may be exposure to
an involuntary termination or layoff plan that cannot be shown to be
age-based.
152

Paolillo v. Dresser Indus. (PaolilloI1), 865 F.2d 37, 40 (2nd Cir.), language modified,

884 F.2d 707 (2nd Cir. 1989); see also supra note 105 (discussing PaolilloIII).
153 Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463, 467 (10th Cir. 1990); see also supra note 84

(explaining the facts and analyzing the approach in Mitchell).
154See 650 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Ill. 1987), vacated in part on other grounds, 704 F. Supp.
162 (N.D. Ill. 1989); supra note 87 and accompanying text.
155 See Statement of Managers, supra note 138, at S13,596.
156 This conclusion is also supported by the express disavowal in the Statement of Managers
of a sentence in the Senate Committee Report on S. 1511. See Statement of Managers, supra
note 138, at S13,596. The disavowed sentence states: "If subsequent layoffs or terminations are

contemplated or discussed, employees should be advised of the criteria by which those
decisions will be made." S. Rep. No. 263, supra note 121, at 27. The reason for the rejection
was undoubtedly the concern of Republican Senators that stating the criteria for subsequent
terminations would be sufficient to make the incentive offer coercive. See S. Rep. No. 263,
supra note 121, at 62.
157 See Statement of Managers, supra note 138 at S13,596 ("The attractiveness of an early
retirement incentive does not call into question the voluntariness of an employee's decision to
take advantage of that incentive.").
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The Senate Labor Committee Report states that "threats of imminent layoffs, intimidation or subtle coercion may, either individually
or collectively, 'require or permit' involuntary retirement in any particular case." ' 8 But the OWBPA provision to which this language
refers states that no "voluntary early retirement incentive plan shall
... require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual...
because of... age." 15 9 The Senate Committee Report is thus consistent with the Henn requirement that a constructive discharge must be
age-based to be illegal. 1" An offeree would have to prove not only
that she was threatened with an imminent layoff, but also that the
threat was either of being laid off for an age-based reason or was made
to her because of her age. By stating that legal early retirement "window" plans are "often used by employers as a means of voluntary
workforce reduction," 6 1 the Senate Report, like the Statement of
Managers,1 62 contemplates the legal use of such plans during at least
some reductions in force, all of which must threaten layoffs being conducted under some standard.
In sum, Title I, read in light of its legislative history, permits
employers to encourage older employees to accept early retirement
offers by the prospect of being laid off, as long as that encouragement
is not effected through the threat of illegal discrimination. Thus, Title
I limits, but does not eliminate, the basic tension between conditional
age-based exit incentives and the principles of the ADEA.
B.

Title 11

The language and history of Title II of the OWBPA confirms this
treatment of conditional age-based exit incentive windows by Title I.
Title II provides a special system for the regulation of the waiver of
ADEA rights. Because the ADEA borrows enforcement procedures
from the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") 163 and patterns its sub158 S. Rep. No. 263, supra note 121, at 27 (emphasis added).

159 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (emphasis added).
160 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
161 S. Rep. No. 263, supra note 121, at 28.
162 Statement of Managers, supra note 138, at S13,596.
163 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988). Section 7(b) of the ADEA states that the ADEA "shall be
enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures" of particular sections of
the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). The Supreme Court has taken the ADEA's incorporation of
FLSA procedures seriously by holding that because the FLSA provides for legal damages and
a jury trial, the ADEA does as well. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 582 (1978) ("This
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stantive commands on those of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act,' " there had been an important debate before the OWBPA over
whether the waiver of ADEA rights should be governed by the especially strict standards governing waiver of FLSA claims 165 or by the
166
somewhat looser standards established by Title VII precedent.
Many members of Congress argued that there are strong reasons not
selectivity that Congress exhibited in incorporating provisions and in modifying certain FLSA
practices strongly suggests that but for those changes Congress expressly made, it intended to
incorporate fully the remedies and procedures of the FLSA.").
164Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (prohibiting age discrimination) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(1988) (prohibiting race, color, religion, sex, and national origin discrimination).
165Relying on established Supreme Court precedent, the Secretary of Labor does not accept
any waiver of FLSA rights that is not supervised either by the Department of Labor under
section 16(c) of the FLSA, or by a federal court under section 16(b) of the FLSA. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 216(b), (c) (1988); Schulte Co. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946); Brooklyn Savings
Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945); see also Age Discrimination in Employment ActWaiver of Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 110-15 (1988) (documenting communications
between Senator Metzenbaum and Labor Department officials).
166In contrast to the waiver of FLSA claims, the courts have long allowed waivers of
mature Title VII claims without government supervision, so long as the waivers are "knowing
and voluntary." See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974);
Torrez v. Public Service Co., 908 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1990); Stroman v. West Coast Grocery
Co., 884 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 151 (1990); Rogers v. General
Electric Co., 781 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986); Pilon v. University of Minn., 710 F.2d 466 (8th Cir.
1983); Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 538 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051
(1978).
In the courts, the advocates of the Title VII "knowing and voluntary" standard for
accepting unsupervised waivers under the ADEA held sway. The leading case is Runyan v.
National Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986); see
also Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448, 451 (3rd Cir. 1988) (rejecting traditional
contract standards used in Runyan in favor of requiring a "careful evaluation of the release
form itself as well as the complete circumstances in which it was executed" in order to
determine whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary); Coventry v. United States Steel Corp.,
856 F.2d 514 (3rd Cir. 1988) (holding same).
Only one district court held that releases of ADEA claims are unenforceable if not
supervised in the same manner as the release of FLSA claims. See Gormin v. Brown-Forman
Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Robert J. Aalberts & Eileen P. Kelly, Waivers
Under the ADEA: An Analysis of the Age Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection
Act of 1989, 1989 Lab. L.3. 739; Michael A. Chagares, Determining the Validity of Waivers
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Third Circuit Approach and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection Act, 19 Seton Hall L. Rev. 678 (1989); Paul
I. Weiner, Can Employees Waive Age Discrimination Act Rights?, in N.Y.U. 41st Annual
Nat'l Conf. on Lab. 12-1 (1988); Robert G. Haas, Note, Waivers Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: Putting the Fair Labor Standards Act Criteria to Rest, 55
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 382 (1987); Wax, supra note 69.
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to allow potential age discrimination claims to be as easily forfeited as
potential race or sex discrimination claims under Title VII:
ADEA waivers often do not arise in the context of an individual dispute. Employers offer "voluntary" exit incentives to groups of
employees as part of voluntary or involuntary termination programs.
There is no dispute between individuals and their employer. There is
also no negotiation between individuals and their employer. The
employer offers the exit incentives on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis.
Moreover, the incentive option is labelled "voluntary" and is financially attractive. In this context, older employees have little or no
reason to suspect that their employer is a potential adversary. These
older workers may be manipulated or even coerced into signing away
their ADEA protections.1 67

Arguments such as these led Congress to pass riders to EEOC
appropriation bills in both 1987 and 1988168 suspending the operation
of an EEOC regulation that permitted the waiver of ADEA claims
without EEOC supervision. 169 They also led Congress to consider
ADEA waiver legislation reported out of Senate and House Committees in 1989 that would have allowed waivers of ADEA claims only
under strict standards after a bona fide claim of age discrimination
170
had been made to the EEOC, a court, or directly to an employer.
However, it was not until the passage of Title II of the OWBPA that
Congress agreed on a new system for treating waivers of ADEA
rights.
Although that system adopts the Title VII "knowing and volun-

tary" standard, it also specifies minimum conditions that a purported
waiver must meet in order to satisfy this standard under the
167 H. Rep. No. 221, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
168 See Departments of Commerce, Justice,

11 (1989).
and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-459, 102 Stat. 2186, 2216 (1988);
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-31 (1987);
134 Cong. Rec. H8399 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1988); 134 Cong. Rec. S10,022 (daily ed. July 27,
1988); 133 Cong. Rec. H12,401, 12,534 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987); 133 Cong. Ree. S14,383-84
(daily ed. Oct. 15, 1987).
169 52 Fed. Reg. 32,296 (1987) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1627.16 (1988)).
170 See H.R. 1432, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989); S. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The
Senate Bill would also have allowed waivers supervised by the EEOC or a court. See S. 54,
supra, § 2. The House Committee on Education and Labor recognized that its recommended
legislation would "preclude employers from obtaining valid and binding waivers as a part of
exit incentive and group termination programs through EEOC supervision of the waiver
process during such programs." H.R. Rep. No. 221, supra note 167, at 17.
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The framing of these conditions confirms that, although

Section 201 of the OWBPA provides:
Section 7 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 626) is
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
(0(1) An individual may not waive any right or claim under this Act unless the
waiver is knowing and voluntary.
Except as provided in paragraph (2), a waiver may not be considered knowing and
voluntary unless at a minimum(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the employer that
is written in a manner calculated to be understood by such individual, or by the
average individual eligible to participate;
(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under this Act;
(C) the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the
waiver is executed;
(D) the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for consideration in
addition to anything of value to which the individual already is entitled;
(E) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing
the agreement;
(F)(i) the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to consider the
agreement; or
(ii) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other
employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees, the
individual is given a period of at least 45 days within which to consider the
agreement;
(G) the agreement provides that for a period of at least 7 days following the
execution of such agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement, and the
agreement shall not become effective or enforceable until the revocation period has
expired;
(H) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other
employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees, the
employer (at the commencement of the period specified in subparagraph (F)) informs
the individual in writing in a manner calculated to be understood by the average
individual eligible to participate, as to(i) any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such program, any eligibility
factors for such program, and any time limits applicable to such program; and
(ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for the program,
and the ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit
who are not eligible or selected for the program.
(2) A waiver in settlement of a charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, or an action filed in court by the individual or the individual's
representative, alleging age discrimination of a kind prohibited under section 4 or 15
may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum(A) subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph (1) have been met; and
(B) the individual is given a reasonable period of time within which to consider
the settlement agreement.
(3) In any dispute that may arise over whether any of the requirements, conditions,
and circumstances set forth in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), or (H)
of paragraph (1), or subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2), have been met, the
party asserting the validity of a waiver shall have the burden of proving in a court of
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Congress was aware and concerned about the potential for employers
violating the ADEA through exit incentive programs, it did not generally condemn any particular classification of such programs. Congressional concern about the potential illegality of exit incentive
programs is expressed by Title I's additional conditions on waivers
"requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment
72
termination program offered to a group or class of employees."'
First, employees must be given a period of at least forty-five days to
consider such requests, rather than the twenty-one day period applicable to other waiver solicitations. 173 Second, at the start of the fortyfive day period, employers must provide detailed, written information

about the group termination program. This information is to include
identification of the class of individuals eligible for the program, the
factors that define their eligibility, the job titles and ages of these individuals, and the ages of all individuals in the same job classifications

that are not eligible or selected for the program. 174 The reason for
these informational requirements, as explained in the Report of the
Senate Committee that drafted them, is to provide solicited employees
with at least some of the information they need to make a realistic

competent jurisdiction that a waiver was knowing and voluntary pursuant to
paragraph (I) or (2).
(4) No waiver agreement may affect the Commission's right and responsibilities to
enforce this Act. No waiver may be used to justify interfering with the protected
right of an employee to file a charge or participate in an investigation or proceeding
conducted by the Commission.
29 U.S.C. § 626(f).
172 29 U.S.C. § 626()(1)(F)(ii); see id. § (f)(1)(G).
173 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)(ii).
174 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H). As reported out of the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee, S.1511 also required an employer seeking a waiver in connection with an exit
incentive program to inform solicited employees of "any demotion, termination, or other
adverse action that the employer either knows or should know may occur if the individual
declines to participate in such program, and the approximate date when such adverse action
reasonably may be anticipated to take effect." S.1511, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. § 201 (1990).
This provision was deleted when a compromise statute was agreed upon during consideration
of S.1511 on the Senate floor. See supra text accompanying note 138. Again, the reason for
the deletion was probably the concern of Republican senators that such information could be
the basis for questioning the "voluntariness" of the program. See S.Rep. No. 263, supra note
121, at 62 (explaining minority views); see also supra note 156 (explaining disavowal by
managers of relevant sentence in committee report).
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assessment of whether the exit incentive program "gives rise to a valid
175
claim under the ADEA."'
This additional regulation of waivers requested in connection with
an exit incentive program, however, should not be interpreted inconsistently with the legislative history of Title I to express a condemnation of all age-based exit incentives. The additional regulation of exit
incentive program waivers indeed rests on an assumption that these
programs, which are of course normally at least partially age-based,
can be offered without the solicitation of waivers of any claims against
the programs. This assumption is expressly stated in the House Committee Report on the House waiver protection legislation that was
eclipsed by the OWBPA. 176 As the House Report acknowledged, that
legislation would have effectively precluded employers from obtaining
77
a waiver as part of an employee's acceptance of an exit incentive.1
Yet rather than in effect condemn all exit incentive programs, the
Committee Report notes that valid waivers are not necessary for the
175S. Rep. No. 263, supra note 121, at 34. The drafters of subsection (H) hoped to
discourage coercive age-based exit incentive programs by requiring disclosure of the age-based
nature of the program as a condition of extracting waivers of claims against it. It seems
doubtful, however, that the provision will accomplish this purpose. Most conditional exit
incentive windows, like those offered in Henn and Paolillo, are overtly age-based. Offerees
who wish to challenge such programs generally have difficulty proving not that they are agebased, but rather that they are accompanied by a concurrent threat of age-based constructive
discharge. The full Senate's deletion of the additional requirement that employers seeking
waivers tell offerees of any adverse action that is anticipated against those who decline the offer
thus seems significant. See supra note 174.
Moreover, even though this additional disclosure requirement would have helped an offeree
to establish constructive discharge, it still would not necessarily have enabled her to prove that
the constructive discharge was age-based. For that she would have to prove that the employer
threatened to subject her to adverse action on the basis of her age, not simply that the
employer stated that she would be subject to the same risk of discharge in a reduction in force
as other younger employees. See Bodnar v. Synpol, Inc., 843 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1988); Henn,
819 F.2d 824; see also supra note 86 (describing showing required under constructive
discharge approach).
Furthermore, an employee who accepted the offer after full disclosure would have had to
sign a valid waiver and therefore could not sue even if she did have a good case of age-based
coercion. Only an employee who declined the offer and the accompanying waiver would be
able to use the information provided in the waiver, and such an employee presumably would
have a cause of action under the ADEA only if she were actually discharged. A shrewd
employer, however, could satisfy its goal of reducing the age of its workforce by threatening
older employees to an extent sufficient to induce acceptances of enough waivers to make actual
age-based discharges unnecessary.
176H. Rep. No. 664, supra note 124, at 52; see also supra note 170 (explaining waiver
provisions in the House and Senate bills).
177H. Rep. No 664, supra note 124, at 52.

Age-Based Exit Incentives

1993]

1327

offer of valuable exit incentive benefits, as evidenced by the high proportion of past exit incentive programs that had not solicited
waivers.

178

Moreover, under Title II an employer who does not seek waivers to
insulate itself from lawsuits by exit incentive offerees need not provide
any special information about its incentive program or meet any other
Title II conditions for valid exit incentive waivers. Title II's treatment of exit incentive waivers is framed to prevent employers from
attempting to insulate themselves from claims that their exit incentive
plans do not meet the standards for legality set out in Title I; this
regulation does not present alternative standards of legality for such
plans.

Furthermore, Title II makes clear that Congress did not view the
acceptance of age-based exit incentives as a de facto waiver of future
ADEA protection. One condition for all valid ADEA waivers under
Title II is that they do not "waive rights or claims that may arise after
the date the waiver is executed." 179 Had Congress viewed age-based
exit incentives as a waiver of future ADEA protection, this provision
would have obviated any additional treatment of such incentives in
either Title I or Title II. The only waiver of ADEA rights through
exit incentive programs about which Congress was concerned was the
waiver of the right to challenge the exit incentive program as being
coercive or discriminatory itself, not the waiver or sacrifice of the protection that the ADEA would give to those threatened with future
discharge if they decline a conditional retirement incentive.
The regulation of ADEA waivers established in Title II also confirms Congress's intent in Title I that courts treating conditional agebased exit incentive offers require both the Henn and Paolillo standards to be met. First, the Henn constructive discharge standard
must be applied to avoid a significant loophole in Title II. Under
Title II, an employer who discharges an employee must meet certain
strict conditions before securing that employee's release of any age
discrimination claims. If the Ackerman decision controlled, an
employer who tells an employee that she will be discharged without
extra benefits if she doesn't resign during the incentive window would
not have to meet those strict conditions. Finding that a threat of
178 Id.
179 Id.

at 25.
§ 626(0(1)(C).
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imminent discharge, concurrent with an exit incentive offer, constitutes grounds for constructive discharge eliminates this loophole; an
employer who wishes to avoid being sued for the constructive discharge would have to meet the Title II conditions in order to secure a
waiver of the employee's right to sue.
Second, Title II also supports the conclusion that the Henn constructive discharge approach must be supplemented with the Paolillo
fair process approach. By requiring minimum periods for consideration, an opportunity to consult with an attorney, and clear written
statements of what is being traded,8 0 Title II expresses a congressional judgment that employees can be manipulated by employers to
accept trades of important rights that the employees would not wish
to make after full and knowledgeable consideration. Approval of
acceptances of resignation incentives without consideration of the
fairness of the process by which the acceptances are secured would be
inconsistent with this design.
In sum, the OWBPA does not require employers to meet the specific conditions of Title II before securing acceptances of early retirement incentives. Congress clearly did not view the acceptance of a
retirement incentive as the waiver of an ADEA right. However,
courts should read the Act as a whole to require the kind of flexible,
fair process approach to voluntariness taken by the Paolillo court, as
well as the constructive discharge approach taken by Henn.
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE OF PROHIBITION
The first two Sections of this Article argue that age-based conditional exit incentive windows obstruct achievement of the antidiscrimination goals of the ADEA, and that the pre-OWBPA judicial
regulation of these incentives under both the Henn and Paolillo precedents was inadequate to remove this obstruction. The immediately
preceding Section argues that the OWBPA can be fairly read to
approve only a combined, perhaps somewhat modified, Henn/Paolillo
approach. This raises the question of what more could have been, or
still could be, done by Congress. The best answer is simply to expand
the Henn approach and treat the offer and acceptance of any agebased conditional exit incentive as tantamount to discriminatory dis180Id. § 626(0(1).
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charge and therefore illegal, without requiring proof of any significant
threat of age discrimination against offerees who decline acceptance.
A.

ProhibitingConditions in Age-Based Exit Incentives

The only practical way to prevent employers from using retirement
incentives to effect the termination of particular workers selected on
the basis of age who would prefer continued employment is to prohibit age-based incentives from being temporally or otherwise conditioned. Offerees who know that a benefit that would be available to
them if they retire now will be denied to them if they are discharged
later must rationally take into account the chances of future discharge
as well as the benefits of retirement when comparing acceptance of
retirement and continued work. Therefore, the only way to be sure
that an employer has not induced the retirement of employees who
prefer continued work is to require the employer to make a binding
promise that the standard of retirement that is offered one day will
continue to be an option for the remainder of the offerees' employment, regardless of how that employment is ultimately terminated. If
such a promise is made, employee-offerees can choose freely between
continued work and retirement at a particular level without concern
about the likelihood that they will not be allowed to continue to work
in any event.
Treating the offer and acceptance of conditional exit incentives as
tantamount to discharge would not prevent employers from offering
general early retirement incentives to any group of employees, however selected. Employers could continue to make retirement as
attractive as they wished, as long as they did not threaten the loss of
both employment and the attractive retirement by making the retirement offer conditional. Eliminating the conditional nature of exit
incentives by treating them as de facto discharges thereby avoids the
most problematic conflicts with the goals of the ADEA, but still generally allows employers to use early retirement incentives.
It also would not be necessary to require employers to pay out the
same present value of retirement benefits to a sixty-five-year-old that
he was first offered as a fifty-five-year-old. The goal should be to
insure that the offeree understands that he will not risk sacrificing a
particular standard of retirement in the future by following his preference for continued work in the present. This requires only that the
annualized retirement income of an offeree who at first declines retire-
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ment and continues work until he is sixty-five will be at least equal to
the annualized retirement income of the offeree who accepts retirement when it is first offered at age fifty-five.181 Requiring more would
be unnecessary. Like any pension plan that offers increased benefits at
a later age, offering more than an equal annualized retirement income
to someone who elects to continue employment to a later age would
encourage employees who did not prefer work to retirement to nonetheless continue work to achieve a higher standard of retirement later.
Employers can, of course, provide such incentives to continued work,
but achievement of the antidiscrimination goals of the ADEA does
182
not require them to do so.
This solution to the tension between age-based conditional exit
incentives and the antidiscrimination goals of the ADEA, however,
would require a clarification of the treatment of the waiver of ADEA
rights given in Title II of the OWBPA. Without a clarification,
employers could circumvent any prohibition of such incentives by
conditioning them on acceptance of a valid waiver of any claim of
illegal discriminatory constructive discharge. Employers would of
course have to meet all the Title II procedural standards, but meeting
these standards would not eliminate the basic pressure on offerees to
accept early retirement benefits to avoid the loss of those benefits in a
later forced termination. Employers who used this loophole and
made acceptance of their conditional exit incentives depend on a valid
waiver would thereby escape the threat of litigation-employees who
accepted the offer would have waived their right to sue, and employees who did not and remained at work could not claim that they were
discharged. 183
181 When lump-sum retirement incentives are offered, such annualization requires actuarial
calculations, similar to those required by an application of the cost-incurred defense for
general benefit programs as codified by the OWBPA. See Id. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i).
182 In fact, most continuing, nonwindow, early retirement incentive plans subsidize early
retirement much less than that which should be permissible. These plans may grant an
annualized income based on what would be the present value of the aggregate pension that a

worker would have achieved had she retired at the "normal" retirement age; that is, they give
the worker credit for the years between her actual "early" retirement and the "normal"

retirement age. See Ippolito, supra note 15, at 562. This still results in lower annualized
pension benefits for the "early" retiree than for the "normal" retiree because the former has
more years through which to spread the same present value of benefits. The level of subsidy is
thus less than the subsidy that would be given by granting the same annualized benefits.
183 Employers offering exit incentives have in fact increasingly elected the waiver option.
The Government Accounting Office report to Congress found that usage of waivers increased
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The clarification that is required to avoid this loophole derives from
an appreciation that the acceptance of a conditional exit incentive
effectively waives not only claims against discriminatory acts that
have already occurred, but also protections against discriminatory
acts that might occur in the future. As explained in Part I.D, an
acceptance of a conditional exit incentive is like a prospective waiver
in that it permits a prospective ADEA defendant to effect a discriminatory design without ever being subject to the risks of litigation. By
contrast, an employer who settles a claim against a discharge that has
already occurred has been vulnerable to suit and is not encouraged to
effect further discrimination. The employer pays for what it has done,
not for the right to do more in the future. 184 Therefore, ADEA rights
of action against discharges effected through conditional exit incentives simply should not be treated as subject to waiver.1 85
B.

Why the OWBPA Failed to Adopt This Approach

The simplicity of this solution to the tension between age-based
conditional exit incentives and the antidiscrimination goals of the
ADEA raises the question of why it was not perceived and embraced
by a Congress quick to reverse the Supreme Court's insulation of discriminatory employee benefit programs from challenge and clear in its
desire to insure that age discrimination protections not be involuntarily waived. There may be two answers to this question, one reflecting
the interests of employers, the other the aggregate interests of older
workers.
after 1984, especially during the last two years studied, 1987 and 1988. Government
Accounting Office, supra note 8, at 6. During these last two years 35% of the companies
offering exit incentives made them conditional on the acceptance of waivers, generally "to
avoid having terminated employees fie claims and lawsuits after receiving enhanced benefits
from exit incentive programs." Id. It is too early to tell whether the explicit requirements for
valid waivers enacted in the OWBPA will result in reduced use.
184 See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
185 This conclusion could not be avoided by adoption of the additional waiver disclosure
standard for exit incentive programs reported out of the Senate Labor Committee but deleted
from the OWBPA before passage on the Senate floor. See supra note 174. This standard
would have required employers to inform offerees of "any demotion, termination, or other
adverse action that the employer either knows or should know may occur if the individual
declines to participate in such program, and the approximate date when such adverse action
reasonably may be anticipated to take effect." S. Rep. No. 263, supra note 121, at 4. However,
this standard would not change the fact that any waiver they signed would enable their
employer to accomplish a discriminatory design that it might never have implemented absent
the agreement.
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From the perspective of employers concerned about the special
costs of employing older workers, the no-waiver solution is undesirable because it impedes their use of early retirement to reduce the
labor costs of filling certain job classifications. As a number of courts
have observed, conditional exit incentives are offered not simply as a
bonus to make retirement at any age above some minimum more
attractive, but rather as an incentive for older employees, who are
likely to be earning more, to retire sooner rather than later."8 6 As
these courts generally have failed to appreciate, however, this design
is inconsistent with the commands of the ADEA because it rests on
unfair blanket generalizations about older workers. 18 7 As argued in
Part I, employers may not act on these generalizations through discriminatory discharges, and should not be able to achieve the same
goals through conditional exit incentives. 88
Of course, if the ADEA allows employers to discharge all workers
who are earning more than their productivity warrants, 18 9 it also

should be acceptable for employers to induce the resignation of any
such workers through conditional exit incentives. Yet in order to be
faithful to the ADEA's antidiscrimination principles, such exit incentives, like direct discharge notices, should be allotted on the basis of
individualized assessments of productivity relative to pay, not on the
basis of age. An employer that claimed it offered only unproductive
older workers early retirement benefits because it felt less responsibility toward unproductive younger workers should then have to show
that it directly terminated younger workers of comparable relative
productivity.
It seems, however, that Congress did not fail to prohibit age-based
conditional exit incentives simply because "efficiency" claims by
employers provoked ambivalence about the application of general
antidiscrimination principles to retirement. The legislative history of
the OWBPA instead suggests that Congress was at least equally concerned that a prohibition of conditions in age-based exit incentives
would not be popular with many older workers. The American Asso186E.g., Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314, 316 (7th Cir. 1988); Paolillo v.
Dresser Indus. (PaolilloI1), 821 F.2d 81, 84 (2nd Cir. 1987).
187Judge Posner's opinion in Karlen is an exception. See supra note 132.

188 See supra text accompanying notes 35-5 1.
189As noted above, this proposition is itself subject to considerable debate because of the
inherent disparate impact on older workers. See supra note 51.
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ciation of Retired Persons ("AARP"), the primary lobbyist for passage of the OWBPA, accepted the OWBPA's endorsement of the
Henn/Paoliloprior law on conditional exit incentives that are offered
only to workers who have reached some minimum age. 19° The
AARP, like the Congress it lobbied, was instead primarily concerned
with Cipriano-typechallenges to early retirement plans. 19 1
The AARP, and the OWBPA congressional advocates that followed its lead, may have been concerned that prohibiting age-based
conditional exit incentives could lead to a significant reduction in the
aggregate retirement benefits offered by American employers. In particular, it may have been concerned that the prohibition of conditional
age-based exit incentives could cause employers to allot fewer
resources to easing the pain of layoffs for older workers. Without the
option of conditional retirement incentives, employers might remove
fewer older workers from work during reductions in force, but those
who were removed, whether young or old, would receive fewer severance benefits. For the AARP, this may be especially troubling
because many of the older workers who accept conditional retirement
incentives probably do prefer retirement at the promised standard to
continued work with the future prospect of retirement at that standard. Prohibiting conditional incentives would prevent such workers
from achieving a retirement that they would prefer to even a guaranteed job. It is therefore not surprising that conditional age-based exit
incentives would be acceptable to the AARP, which must be primarily concerned with the income of the retired persons that dominate its
membership, rather than the rights of working older persons to be
protected from discriminatory treatment in their jobs.
This explanation of Congress's failure to treat the offer of age-based
conditional exit incentives as tantamount to discharges does not, however, change the fact that this failure significantly compromises the
antidiscrimination purposes of the ADEA. For even if the fuller regulation of conditional exit incentives would result in the reduction of
retirement benefits for many workers, it is also clear that the present
190 See Joint Hearing, supra note 124, at 467, 471 (providing answers of Horace B. Deets,

Executive Director of AARP, to questions from Senators Pryor and Metzenbaum regarding
early retirement incentives); see also id. at 300-02 (providing prepared statement of
Christopher Mackaronis, former Manager of Advocacy Programs in the AARP Worker
Equity Department).
191 See id. at 174-75 (providing prepared statement of Horace B. Deets, Executive Director
of AARP); id. at 303-02 (providing prepared statement of Christopher Mackaronis).
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regulation as approved by Congress enables employers on the basis of
age-based generalizations to induce the termination of older workers
who would prefer to continue to work.
As stressed in Part I, antidiscrimination law has never accepted this
sort of advantage for some protected status group members as a justification for the disparate treatment of others. 192 The applicable analogy of the prospective waiver of antidiscrimination rights proved
instructive in Part I. The OWBPA confirms that employers cannot
purchase the right to implement discriminatory programs, regardless
of the generosity of the purchase price and the number of protected
employees who are anxious to receive it.1 93 The goals of antidiscrimination law are not simply private; they also include the public
goal of preventing employment decisions from being made on the
basis of status-based generalizations that are unfair to many individuals, even when they help many others. This is particularly true of the
ADEA, which was based on an understanding that the employment
problems of older workers derive substantially from age-based generalizations that are not usually based on animus. 194
Employers might argue that even though age-based conditional exit
incentive offers disadvantage some older offerees, antidiscrimination
principles do not demand that they be treated like age-based terminations, because the former are not necessarily based on generalizations
192See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
193See supra text accompanying note 179.
194See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621(a)(2), (b); Wirtz Report, supra note 13, at 6. Congress's primary
concern in the ADEA was that older workers be given a fair opportunity to be free from the
stigmatization created by age-based decisionmaking, as opposed to the goal of improving the
aggregate economic position of older Americans as a group through encouraging more
lucrative pensions. For instance, the legislative findings and purposes set forth in section 2 of
the Act stress the impact of the "setting of arbitrary age limits" and "arbitrary age
discrimination" on the "employment" of older workers "with resultant deterioration of skill,
morale, and employer acceptability." 29 U.S.C §§ 621(a(l)-(3), (b). Furthermore, the
comments of supporters of the ADEA are replete with expressions of concern about the
impact of unemployment on older workers who could be productive. See, e.g., 113 Cong. Rec.
35,056 (1967) (statement of Sen. Randolph); 113 Cong. Rec. 34,743 (1967) (statement of Rep.
Kelly). The legislative history of the 1978 and 1986 amendments to the ADEA reflect the
same primary congressional goals. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 756, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7
(1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5628, 5631-33 (stressing the need to retain productive
workers and the declining health that can result from premature retirement); S. Rep. No. 493,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504, 507 (focusing on the same
consideration). The ultimate primary goals of the ADEA are thus in tension with any
indulgence of age-based plans to induce the termination of those who would prefer work to
retirement, regardless of the aggregate impact of these plans on pensions.
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about older workers. As noted above, however, employment discrimination law generally has not excused the disparate treatment of protected status groups that results in disparate effects simply because the
disparate treatment may have a benign motivation. 195 The possibility
of benign motivation does not make a strong case for rejecting the
basic prohibition of the kind of age-based conditional exit incentive
offers that have pervaded the economy in the last decade.
C. Qualifications to Prohibition
The plausibility of benign motivation, however, does suggest two
possible qualifications to the approach to prohibition suggested above.
The first qualification would clarify that the offer of age-based retirement incentives to those who voluntarily resign is not a constructive
discharge simply because the employer conditions the grant of exit
incentives to involuntarily terminated employees on their acceptance
of a valid waiver of their rights to sue. This qualification would permit employers to protect themselves from costly litigation after the
acceptance of a retirement bonus, without compromising the protection of ADEA goals. The qualification is based on a recognition that
employees who resign with special retirement benefits are less likely,
and less able, to sue than employees who are discharged, even if the
resigning employees do not formally waive their rights to sue. This
fact explains why an employer would not want to provide the same
retirement benefits to a discharged employee who could practically
and legally threaten to sue the employer for the discharge as to an
employee who could not. It does not, however, prevent the employer
from offering the special retirement benefits as a settlement of any
unfair dismissal claim to any employee who it discharged. Requiring
this offer of a settlement would insure that an employee offered a
bonus for voluntary retirement would not feel compelled to accept the
bonus to avoid a later, less desirable forced retirement. The employee
would know that the enhanced retirement would be available even if
he were discharged. He simply might have to make a hard choice on
settlement of any unfair discharge claim at that time.
This qualification admittedly would not satisfy employers who
claimed an unwillingness to give additional retirement benefits to
workers who, by refusing resignation, forced the expenditure of funds
195See supra text accompanying note 37.
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on evaluations of their individual contributions to firm productivity.
This claim, however, is much less compelling than the reluctance to
give additional benefits to those who have the capability of suing for
their termination. Recall again that one of the central purposes of the
ADEA is to encourage consideration of the individual merit of older
workers and to prevent reliance on generalizations about the decline
of productivity with age. A desire to avoid the costs of individual
evaluations may not be equivalent to a desire to reduce the age of the
workforce, but it is nonetheless ultimately in tension with the broad
goals of the ADEA.
A second possible qualification on the prohibition of age-based conditional exit incentives is suggested by the plausibility of benign motivations underlying such incentives during reductions in force.
Employers can claim that there are good reasons why their calculations of the costs and benefits of generous retirement allotments may
be different during such periods than during periods when they discharge only unproductive workers. During reductions in force, the
costs of losing productive older workers are less, whereas the internal
public relations benefits of providing more comfortable retirements
may be greater. Employers therefore may be unwilling to offer retirement incentives to older workers during periods of retrenchment if
the employers are told they will be vulnerable to constructive discharge suits if they do not promise the older offerees that they can
obtain the same benefits if they retire later in a period of expansion.
This concern could be addressed by requiring employers to promise
only that they will offer the same retirement benefits to any employee
who resigns or is discharged during a reduction in force. An
employer who did not offer the same retirement benefits to a discharged employee that it previously had offered the employee would
have to establish that the prior offer was part of a reduction in force
program and that the employee had been later discharged not as part
of a cutback in employment, but rather because of her individual
performance.
This qualification on the prohibition of conditional age-based exit
incentive offers, unlike the first qualification, would compromise to
some extent the purposes of the ADEA. Employees offered retirement incentives as part of an employment cutback could not be pressured into acceptance by the fear that the cutback would result in a
layoff without enhanced retirement. On the other hand, such offerees
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would still have to calculate the chances that they would be forced by
their employer, or by their own condition, to retire later without the
enhanced benefits. Some employees who would prefer to continue to
work would therefore still choose retirement because of the conditional nature of the incentive. In light of Congress's apparent concern

about not discouraging retirement incentive offers that could soften
the effects of reductions in force, however, this qualification seems a
plausible and perhaps necessary compromise of antidiscrimination
goals. It certainly is sensible to treat exit incentives offered during
reductions in force more leniently than those offered, as in Henn, simply to facilitate a change in personnel. There is no plausible reason
why an employer that is willing to give benefits to older workers if
they retire and are replaced by younger personnel should not be willing to offer the same benefits to these older employees if they decline
196
retirement and are later discharged.
Other possible qualifications of the prohibition approach suggested

here might be based primarily not on benign employer motives for
age-based conditional exit incentives, but rather on the intuition of
many in Congress and the judiciary that such incentives may only be
undesirable to the extent they carry a threat of involuntary discharge.
This intuition is in part what underlies the embracing of the Henn

approach by both branches.
One qualification this suggests is that the required promise of future
offers of enhanced benefits need apply only to future involuntary discharges, not to future voluntary resignations. The argument for this
qualification is relatively straightforward. Employees can only be
196An employer, however, conceivably might have a plausible reason for the intermittent
offer of window plans during periods when it was not reducing its force. The employer might
take the position that it wants to give its most senior managerial employees the option of
retiring early with generous benefits, but does not want to do so on a continuing basis because
of its need to plan rationally for the future. Such an employer might tell offerees of its
intermittent window plans that they need not fear any increased chance of discharge if they
decline any offer. This plausible scenario might warrant a further compromise on the basic
principle espoused in the text. Employers might be allowed to offer time-conditioned, agebased incentives during periods when they are not reducing their force, if they make
commitments that there will not be more stringent evaluations of those who decline the offer
and those commitments are consistent with their past practice.
However, such a qualification would still compromise antidiscrimination goals because some
workers would remain fearful that they could be forced to retire during a period without a
window incentive. Furthermore, the difficulty of gathering information about past practices
would make this qualification difficult to implement.
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coerced into accepting a retirement incentive by an explicit or implicit
threat of a later involuntary termination without the incentive. They
cannot be coerced by the possibility that their preference for continued work over retirement might change at a point when they no
longer have the option of enhanced benefits. We need not be concerned about employees choosing retirement because of the latter possibility, even though they may still prefer continued work now. Such
choices simply reflect some hard intrapersonal balancing between
present preferences and likely future preferences.
There are two problems with this qualification, one with the feasibility of its implementation, and one with its theoretical basis. The
practical problem-the difficulty of distinguishing between voluntary
resignations and forced discharges-should be sufficient reason to
reject the compromise for the type of age-based conditional window
plan utilized in Henn and Paolillo. If the compromise were adopted
for such plans, employees who wanted to retire and claim previously
offered retirement incentives could provoke a discharge by purposefully working less productively. To avoid such strategic behavior, the
courts would have to try to develop some kind of "constructive resignation" doctrine, which probably would do more to generate litigation than to accurately distinguish cases.
The theoretical basis underlying this qualification is also problematic, in that it could support a fully practical insulation of conditional
exit incentive plans of the kind involved in Cipriano and Karlen. In
those cases, the employer offered additional retirement benefits to
employees who retired while they passed through a particular age
band, between the ages of fifty-five and sixty in Cipriano and between
fifty-five and sixty-four in Karlen. This type of age-based conditional
exit incentive encourages the retirement of older workers within the
favored age band, not by threatening them with discharge after passing through the upper limit of the band, but rather by making clear
that any retirement after this limit will be at a lower level. If it were
true that antidiscrimination law should be concerned only with
acceptances induced by fear of discharge after nonacceptance, we
should not be troubled by the effects of offering retirement incentives
to workers only while they are passing through particular age ranges.
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This theory, however, is not correct. As Judge Posner recognized
in Karlen, 197 retirement offers limited to certain age bands are in tension with the purposes of the ADEA because they enable employers
to achieve a design that the Act condemns: the elimination of older
workers who would prefer to continue to work. The fact that this is
achieved by denying a benefit to workers beyond a certain age at
retirement that is made available to certain younger workers, rather
than by termination threats, does not change the fact that an agebased plan can be used to reduce the age of a workforce because of
age-based generalizations about the present or future productivity of
older workers.
Further, it is not clear that a compromise that would allow a Cipriano-type plan, although condemning a Henn-type plan, would actually be more politically acceptable. As noted above, the AARP has
been clearly more hostile to Cipriano-typeplans, if only because they
discriminate against nonofferee older workers. Though the AARP
seems not to have met its goal, 198 it apparently would have liked to
prohibit any retirement benefit plan that favored younger retirees
within a preferred age band over older retirees beyond the age
band. 199

There are, however, practically feasible and politically attractive
qualifications of the full prohibition of conditional age-based exit
incentives that are supported by this theoretically flawed but intuitively attractive notion that the ADEA should only be concerned with
acceptances that are induced by some fear of subsequent discharge.
These compromises would allow employees to escape the worst effects
of age-based exit incentives and yet would allow such incentives to
remain relatively attractive to employers.
One possible compromise would be to allow employers to secure
agreements from union representatives to offer conditional age-based
exit incentives to represented employees protected from arbitrary discharge by "just cause" and seniority clauses in collective bargaining
agreements. A unionized employee who challenged his acceptance of
such a negotiated exit incentive might be forced to show that his collective bargaining agreement did not offer him secure protection from
the fear of discharge without the incentive. This would appeal to
See supra note 132.
198 See supra text accompanying note 142.
199 See supra note 191.
197
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unions anxious to negotiate extra retirement benefits that would be
attractive to a majority of their membership. It nonetheless would
remain a compromise because organized employees who would prefer
continuing to work would still be potentially pressured to accept conditional incentives even if they felt fully protected by their collective
agreement: they not only could fear a total shutdown of their operation, they also could anticipate not being able to work productively at
a later time when the incentive was not made available.
Another politically attractive compromise would be to allow
employers to reduce the retirement benefits offered under permanent
or "threshold," rather than window, plans. In a threshold plan, once
an employee achieves eligibility for a certain level of retirement benefits, she retains that eligibility as long as she is employed. However,
the compromise would allow permanent reductions in benefits offered
under such plans, not only for employees who had not yet achieved
eligibility for the higher benefits but also for employees who had
achieved eligibility. This allowance would be a compromise because
employees might be forced to decide to retire today because of the
ever-present possibility that their employer will announce a reduction
in retirement benefits tomorrow.
It remains politically attractive for two reasons. First, in most circumstances, the possible change in a permanent plan, rather than the
closure of a temporary window plan, would not induce fear of involuntary discharge. Second, the compromise would avert the chance
that employers would be discouraged from offering generous retirement benefits because of a fear that currently healthy business and
pension accounts will turn sickly sometime in the future. This compromise is thus also supported by a plausible benign employer motivation for the immediate reduction of retirement benefits offered in
threshold, rather than in window plans.
Any such compromise, however, should be limited to insure that
employers do not manipulate threshold plans for the purpose of
reducing the age of their workforce. The law might be drafted to prohibit any pattern of changes in threshold plans that have the effect of
inducing employees to retire in some limited time period while benefits are high. For instance, employers should not be permitted to
establish a pattern of alternative reductions and enhancements in
retirement benefits that would unnecessarily augment employees' anxiety about the need to retire quickly. In addition, employers should

1993]

Age-Based Exit Incentives

1341

not be allowed to announce a future reduction in retirement benefits
that makes eligible employees feel pressured to retire while benefits
are still high."o° Of course, in some cases employees will be able to
predict a possible reduction in retirement benefits because of the
financial condition of their employer. For instance, employees might
fear that an economically strapped employer asking for concessions
from their union during a round of collective bargaining would not
continue its pension commitments after the term of the present collective agreement expires. 201 The law need only ask that an employer
not intentionally aggravate such fears with unnecessary comments
about the likelihood of cutbacks, or even with strategic silence when it
knows pension cutbacks will not be negotiated. °2
CONCLUSION

The primary argument of this Article has not been that conditional
age-based exit incentives should be prohibited because such incentives
do more harm than good. This Article has argued not from first
moral or ethical principles, but rather from the principles of antidiscrimination law expressed in the ADEA and other status discrimination laws as interpreted by the courts. The main argument has been
that the law's current treatment of conditional age-based exit incentives is disturbingly inconsistent with these principles.
The normative goals of particular laws, including antidiscrimination laws, of course may be compromised to serve other social goals.
Nevertheless, when compromises between conflicting social goals in
one aspect of the law are inconsistent with the majority of similar
200 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1990); see also supra note
84 (explaining the facts and analyzing the approach in Mitchell).

201 See Bartman v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 799 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that
retirements during period of collective bargaining that might have resulted in pension cutbacks
were not constructive discharges).
202 The court in Bartman thus may have been too quick to conclude that the pressured early
retirements in that case could not be treated as constructive discharges because the employer
committed no "act" to induce the retirements, but rather simply declined to rescue its
employees from a difficult choice. Id. at 315. The employer in fact may not have been able to
rescue the employees without compromising the collective bargaining that it had a right to
conduct under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988). However, the
Bartman court never determined whether pensions were even a subject of bargaining or
whether the employer instead simply took advantage of employee fears to induce an
extraordinary number of early retirements.
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compromises that pervade that same area of the law, this discongruity
raises serious questions which must be addressed.
For those who are convinced of the validity of the pervading compromises, highlighting such inconsistencies may make a compelling
case for the reform of the anomalous legal doctrine. For instance,
those who embrace the congressional judgment that mandatory retirement plans ought to be prohibited should hesitate to accept conditional age-based exit incentives, once it is established that such
incentives have the same effect as mandatory retirement.2 3 Similarly,
those who accept the dominant legal doctrine that benign motivations
should not excuse status-based employment decisions should hesitate
to accept benign motivation as a justification for conditional age-based
exit incentives.2°
Furthermore, the fundamental consistency of law is an important
social goal in itself-sufficiently important, indeed, to balance against
the goals of substantive justice. Thus, if a critic of the prohibition of
mandatory retirement, or even of age discrimination regulation in
general, independently valued consistency or coherence as a goal of
the legal system, that critic might be persuaded by this Article's argument that conditional age-based exit incentives ought to be further
regulated.
There are numerous reasons why a critic's lack of allegiance to the
ADEA's goals might be trumped by a commitment to the coherence
of antidiscrimination legislation. Legal coherence may be valued
highly for several reasons. Perhaps most importantly, it serves goals
of equality, insuring that individuals in positions that are equal in all
relevant respects are treated equally.20 5 It insures, for instance, that
203 See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
204 See supra text accompanying note 37. Moreover, highlighting inconsistent compromises
in the law may be especially compelling when the actual nature of an anomalous compromise
is not obvious. Analysis may reveal that the framers of the anomalous compromise have
disserved the society's dominant normative goals by a hidden sacrifice of those goals to other,
less compelling, conflicting goals. Legislative rhetoric is often used to obscure such
compromises and to suggest that all desirable goals are being served simultaneously. The
OWBPA's acceptance of the Henn/Paolilo compromise of the ADEA's nondiscrimination
principles is an excellent example because this compromise has been obscured by the rhetoric
of not only the congressional debate on overturning Betts, but also by the judicial treatment of
conditional age-based exit incentives.
205 1 recognize that the determination of what factors are "relevant" to a finding of equality
of position requires the application of standards of substantive justice. This does not, however,
undermine the basic argument in the text-that a critic of one legal doctrine might support the
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individuals who are induced to sell their protection from future age
discrimination for some exit incentive benefit are not given less legal
solicitude than individuals who are induced to sell their protection
from age discrimination to which they have already been subject." 6
Our legal culture places a high value on treating like cases alike, framing it in some contexts as a constitutional principle.207
Consistency of law serves other social goals as well. Among those
goals are the control of favoritism or corruption, and nurturing the
legitimacy of the law in the public's perception. The former may not
be relevant to the present regulation of conditional age-based exit
incentives, but the latter may well be. Cynicism, rather than respect
for the law, may be engendered in individuals who are promised legal
protection from a retirement they do not desire but who then find
themselves defenseless from the dilemma created by conditional exit
incentives.
Ronald Dworkin makes these and further claims for consistency in
the law, or what he more broadly defines as "integrity. 2 0 8 These
include its contribution to the efficient development of legal doctrine,
free of the need for "detailed legislation or adjudication on each possible point of conflict. ' 20 9 He argues that the viability of coherent legal
principles enables the law to be applied more fluently, without requiring some lawmaking body to articulate rigid particularistic compromises to map the rough terrain of incoherence.2 10
This Article does not argue that consistency or coherence is a necessary central attribute of legitimate law. It does not contend that
Dworkin necessarily correctly identifies the reasons why consistency
may be important to law, or even that legal consistency necessarily
should be valued for itself.21I This Article argues only that there are
strong reasons, including the independent appeal of consistent antidiscrimination law, why the law's present anomalous treatment of condiadoption of another legal doctrine with which he also disagrees, as long as the first doctrine is
in effect.
206 See supra text accompanying notes 60-69.
207 See Michael C. Harper & Ira C. Lupu, Fair Representation as Equal Protection, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 1211, 1223-27 (1985).
208 See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 186-224 (1986).
209 Id. at 188.
210 Id. at 190.

211 For many of the reasons expressed in the text, however, I certainly agree with Dworkin
that it should be.
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tional age-based exit incentives makes a compelling case for legal
reform, even without making the case for age discrimination regulation in general. This Article explains how the OWBPA's treatment of
exit incentives fails to fulfill the promises that Congress has repeatedly
made to the older American worker since the passage of the ADEA.
Those who applaud those promises should be troubled. Those who do
not, but who still value legal consistency, should be as well.

